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8	BEFORE THE STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD
9 10	In the matter of Administrative Civil Liability Complaint issued against G. Scott Fahey and Sugar Pine Spring
11	Water, LP
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INTRODUCTION

I.

G. Scott Fahey and Sugar Pine Spring Water, LP (collectively "Mr. Fahey" or "Fahey") responded to the Hearing Officer's request for supplemental briefing.

With regard to responding to the Prosecution Team's Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine, Fahey's arguments about the Raker Act, the Fourth Agreement, and the obsolescence of Water Right Decision 995 ("D995") are not relevant to whether an unlawful diversion occurred, because they are not relevant to Fahey's priority of right or the availability of water for his priority of right. The evidence, argument, and testimony are similarly irrelevant to whether Fahey has a right in addition to his permits that would have authorized his diversions, because none of the evidence, argument, and testimony are relevant to whether Fahey has a storage right or something similar. Fahey even acknowledged that he has no such right.

Fahey also asserts that the Prosecution Team improperly withheld Exhibit WR-147, but WR-147 and the associated testimony of Mr. Sam Cole was intended as rebuttal evidence and, until disclosed at the hearing, privileged as attorney work product. Fahey also objects to this evidence on the basis of hearsay, but WR-147 and Mr. Cole's associated testimony are nonetheless admissible, because they supplement and explain other evidence. They are also submitted for the purpose of attacking Mr. Fahey's credibility and not for the truth of the matter asserted.

Finally, Fahey objects to slides 3-5 that were included in Prosecution Team Exhibit WR-153 – the Prosecution Team's rebuttal presentation. However, this evidence is admissible as properly submitted rebuttal testimony. Fahey also claims the Prosecution Team wrongfully withheld these documents, but contrary to Fahey's assertions they were made available to him long before the hearing.

II. THE EVIDENCE THE PROSECUTION TEAM OBJECTED TO IN ITS PRE-HEARING MOTION TO STRIKE/MOTION IN LIMINE IS NOT RELEVANT TO WHETHER AN UNLAWFUL DIVERSION OCCURRED PER KEY ISSUE 1.

A. None of the Disputed Evidence is Relevant to Whether an Unlawful Diversion Occurred, Because it Does Not Alter Fahey's Priority of Right or the Availability of Water for His Priority of Right.

In his Supplemental Evidence Brief, Fahey argues that his "correct interpretation" of how he must comply with his permits demonstrates he fit into the "available water" exception during the period water was not available for his priority of right. (Fahey's Supplemental Brief on Evidentiary Objections¹ ("Fahey Evid. Br."), pp. 1, 9-10.) As the Prosecution Team explained in its Post-Hearing Evidence Brief however, nothing Fahey asserts with regard to the Raker Act, the Fourth Agreement, D995, or the "correct interpretation" of his permit terms affects his priority of right or the availability of water for his priority of right. (PT Evid. Br., pp. 1-12.)

Fahey's arguments about the Raker Act, the Fourth Agreement, and his permit terms are straw men that only confuse the issues.² Fahey does not explain how the Raker Act or the Fourth Agreement would affect his priority of right or the availability of water for his priority of right. He alleges that the Raker Act and Fourth Agreement "altered" Water Right Decision 1594 ("D1594") and D995, but D995 and D1594 are only relevant to fully appropriated stream ("FAS") determinations, which have nothing to do with Fahey's priority of right or the availability of water for his priority of right. Fahey also cites no order or decision of the State Water Board rescinding or modifying the FAS determinations for the San Joaquin River and Tuolumne River. Terms 19 and 20 in Permit 20784 or Term 34 in Permit 21289, all of which require Fahey to maintain and comply with the 1992. Exchange Agreement, allow Fahey to divert water during the FAS by means of a physical solution, but a physical solution cannot affect his priority of right. (PT Evid. Br., p. 4; Fahey-44; see City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1250.) Regardless, Fahey cannot contest the FAS determinations in the current proceeding, because it has not been noticed as a FAS proceeding pursuant to Water Code section 1205. (PT Evid. Br., pp. 4-5.) He cites no statute or other authority that would authorize the State Water Board to modify or rescind a FAS determination outside of a properly noticed FAS proceeding.

Fahey's evidence, argument, and testimony regarding his "correct interpretation" of his permits based the Raker Act, the Fourth Agreement, D995, and D1594 is irrelevant to

- http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/hearings/fahey/docs/fahey_faheysuppbri ef041116.pdf
- ²⁶ Fahey's portion of the post-hearing evidence brief appears copied form his opposition to the Prosecution Team's Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine. It even describes oral testimony that Fahey "will" make at the hearing as an offer of proof. (Fahey Evid. Br., p. 7:14-17.) Fahey clearly does not take this issue seriously and is only using these arguments to sow confusion.

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Key Issue 1(a) – whether Fahey diverted water under his permits when water was unavailable for diversion under his priority of right.

B. None of the Disputed Evidence is Relevant to Whether Fahey Has a Water Right in Addition to His Permits That Would Have Authorized His Diversions.

With respect to Key Issue 1(b), none of the evidence the Prosecution Team objected to in its Pre-Hearing Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine would establish that Fahey holds or claims any water rights other than his permits that would authorize the diversions.

Neither of Fahey's permits grants him a storage right or the equivalent. (WR-15, 16; Hrg. Trns. (Jan 25, 2016), p. 100:19-22, 124:19-124:17.) Neither do his permits modify the rights for New Don Pedro in manner allowing him to store water in New Don Pedro for use in subsequent seasons. (Hrg. Trns. (Jan 25, 2016), p. 125:20-126:1.) Terms 19 and 20 in Permit 20784 and Term 34 in Permit 21289 both require Fahey to maintain and comply with the 1992 Exchange Agreement. (WR-15: WR-16; WR-9, p. 4 at ¶ 20, pp. 5 at ¶ 25, pp. 5-6 at ¶ 28; Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016), pp. 45:19-46:2, 48:21, 49:3-22.) The 1992 Exchange Agreement allows him to "build a surplus prior to the period of unavailability," but specifically states "no carryover will be allowed to subsequent years." (WR-19.) The 1992 Exchange Agreement further states that "Fahey shall not accrue any interest in the Districts' water rights by virtue of this Agreement" and "Nothing contained herein shall be construed as a grant of water rights or an interest in the Districts' water rights." (Id.) Term 20 in Permit 20784 and Term 34 in Permit 21289 also state that "Replacement water may be provided in advance and credited to future replacement water requirements." (WR-15, 16.) However, since the permits themselves do not authorize storage, this clause cannot be read to entitle Fahey to water he diverts into New Don Pedro for his use in subsequent years. (Hrg. Trns. (Jan 25, 2016), p. 125:20-126:2-6, 138:4-11.) Any "credit" or surplus he retains at the end of a year is lost.

On cross-examination, Fahey did not disagree, acknowledging that -

- He has no water right for storage. (Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016), p. 181:23-25.)
- His permits do not authorize storage. (Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016), p. 181:18-22.)

 He has no storage right for New Don Pedro. (Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016), pp. 174:8-10, 182:1-4.)

He has no agreement with the Districts or with San Francisco allowing him to store • water in New Don Pedro for his use in subsequent years. (Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2 2016), p. 182:5-8.) 3 He has not submitted any evidence into the record documenting any accounting 4 method used by the Districts or with San Francisco that would reflect an 5 entitlement for him to divert water into New Don Pedro and use it in subsequent years. (Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016), pp. 182:9-183:1.) 6 Under the 1992 Exchange Agreement with the Districts, he cannot carry over any surplus water he diverts into New Don Pedro to a subsequent season. (Hrg. Trns. 8 (Jan. 25, 2016), pp. 187:2-4.) 9 Under the 1992 Exchange Agreement with the Districts, he is not entitled to any 10 interest in the Districts' water rights, including the right to store water in New Don 11 Pedro. (Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016), pp. 187:5-10.) 12 He never communicated with the Districts or with San Francisco with regard to his diversions prior to his June 3, 2014 letter. (Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016), p. 183:17-13 21.) 14 During the year he does not tell the Districts when he diverts water or how much 15 water he diverts. (Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016), p. 184:8-10.) 16 In short, Fahey acknowledged that he has no right to divert water into New Don Pedro 17 and use it in subsequent years. The contrary would require granting him the equivalent of 18 a storage right in New Don Pedro, a reservoir he does not own, and interfere with the 19 water rights of the Districts and San Francisco, something his permits prohibit and something Fahey states he cannot do and does not wish to do. (WR-15 at ¶¶ 15, 20; WR-20 16 at ¶ 33, Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016), pp. 95:9-13, 105:1-7; 152:1-12; 228:15-17.) He is 21 also not a party to the Fourth Agreement. (Fahey-77; 63 Cong. Ch. 4, December 19, 22 1913, 38 Stat. 242; Fahey-79.) The evidence, argument, and testimony the Prosecution 23 Team objected to in its Pre-Hearing Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine are not relevant to 24 whether Fahey has any water rights in addition to his permits that would have authorized 25 his diversions. They are therefore irrelevant to Key Issue 1(b). The disputed evidence does not otherwise establish that Fahey has any other right 26 to wheel water into New Don Pedro and keep it there until he needs it. It is therefore also irrelevant to Key Issue 1(c).

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C. Fahey's Groundwater Arguments Are Irrelevant to Key Issue 1, **Because His Rights Exclude Groundwater**

With respect to groundwater, Fahey argues the evidence is relevant to "licensing" to establish that the water he wheeled into New Don Pedro Reservoir in 2009-2011 covered all of his water diversions during the period of unavailability and FAS period. (Fahey Evid. Br., pp. 1, 10-11.) However, as the Prosecution Team explains in its Post-Hearing Evidence Brief, Fahey's permits, in establishing that the springs are tributaries to the Tuolumne River, preclude any groundwater right associated with the springs independent of any water tributary to the Tuolumne River. (PT Evid. Br., pp. 8-10.) Fahey and his consultant Dr. Ross Grunwald even acknowledged that, although the springs appear to draw groundwater, additional studies are necessary to determine how much groundwater they draw. (Fahey 71, p. 2; Hrg. Trns (Jan. 25, 2016), p. 242:12-244:5.) Fahey's testimony is therefore irrelevant as to "licensing."

"Good faith" is Irrelevant to Whether a Trespass Occurs Under Water D. Code Section 1052

Fahey also asserts that his "correct interpretation" of how he must comply with his permits is relevant to show he acted in good faith. (Fahey Evid. Br., pp. 1, 10-11.) Although Water Code section 1055.3 requires consideration of all relevant factors in determining the amount of administrative civil liability ("ACL"), whether a diverter acts in "good faith" is not relevant to whether a trespass occurs under Water Code section 1052, which provides that "the diversion or use of water subject to [Division 2] other than as authorized in this division is a trespass." Nothing in Division 2 of the Water Code recognizes "good faith" or allows an appropriation based on "good faith." Fahey's "good faith" is therefore irrelevant to Key Issue 1.

III.

EXHIBIT WR-147 AND RELATED TESTIMONY IS ADMISSIBLE

The Prosecution Team Was Not Required to Disclose WR-147 Before Α. the Hearing.

Fahey's counsel objected to the WR-147 and the related testimony of Mr. Sam Cole on the basis that the Prosecution Team did not disclose it before the hearing. (Hrg. Trans. (Jan. 25, 2016), pp. 133:8-15, 147:9-14; Hrg. Trans. (Jan. 26, 2016), p. 2:21-3:7; Fahey Evid. Br., pp. 11-13.) However, the Prosecution Team had no such obligation.

As explained in the Prosecution Team's Post-Hearing Evidence Brief, WR-147 was prepared after the Prosecution Team submitted its case in chief and was intended as

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rebuttal evidence. (PT Evid. Br., pp. 12-14.) The Hearing Notice, which set forth the procedures for the hearing, specifically allowed the parties to introduce new evidence on rebuttal. (WR-6, p. 6 ["Rebuttal evidence is new evidence used to rebut evidence presented by another party... Rebuttal testimony and exhibits need not be submitted prior to the hearing."].)

In addition, the Hearing Officers' Partial Ruling on Prosecution Team's December 10 and December 11 Motions for Protective Order or, Alternately, Motions to Quash: Fahey's Opposition; and Fahey's December 18 Motion to Compel Depositions and Document Disclosures³ ("January 21, 2016 Order") only applied to the case in chief. (January 21, 2016 Order, p. 10; Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 26, 2016), p. 1:10-13.) Consistent with the hearing procedures set forth in the Hearing Notice, it did not require disclosure of evidence potentially intended for rebuttal. (*Id.*) Since WR-147 was prepared after the Prosecution Team submitted its case in chief, it was not used to prepare any of the testimony, conclusions, or reports for the case in chief.

The January 21, 2016 Order also did not require the Prosecution Team to disclose anything privileged. (*Id.* ["The Prosecution Team's motion is also granted for those documents to which the attorney-client communications privilege or the attorney work product privilege actually applies and has not been waived."].) WR-147 was attorney work product and therefore privileged. (PT Evid. Br., pp. 14-15.) Until the Prosecution Team chose to waive that privilege, it had every right not to disclose WR-147. The Prosecution Team was therefore not required to disclose WR-147 before the hearing.

B. WR-147 and the Related Testimony is Admissible.

Fahey's counsel also objected to WR-147 and the associated testimony of Mr. Cole and Ms. Katherine Mrowka on the basis of hearsay. Hearsay is evidence of a statement that was not made by a witness while testifying at the hearing and is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) In an administrative hearing, hearsay is admissible to supplement or explain other evidence and, on its own, may support a finding if it would be admissible over objection in a civil action. (Gov. Code § 11513, subd. (d).) In a civil action, hearsay evidence is admissible to attack the credibility

³See <u>http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/hearings/fahey/docs/fahey_proceduralrul ing012116.pdf</u>

of a declarant if the declarant were a witness at the hearing. (Evid. Code § 1202; see also People v. Marquez (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 993, 998.)

WR-147 and Mr. Cole's testimony was intended to supplement and explain Mr. Fahey's statement in his e-mail referencing New Don Pedro operating to avoid overflow and Fahey's other statements that any water he diverted into New Don Pedro would have been lost if New Don Pedro spilled. (PT Evid. Br., pp 13-14; Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016), pp. 132:11-133:24⁴, 142:16-146:16⁵.) This evidence would explain and supplement Fahey's previous statement acknowledging that New Don Pedro was operating to avoid overflow to attack the credibility of his later statement that he still had water available in New Don Pedro to offset his diversions in 2014 and 2015. (*Id.*) Since the purpose of WR-147 and Mr. Cole's related testimony was to attack Mr. Fahey's credibility and not for the truth of the matter asserted, it is admissible over objection in a civil proceeding. Consequently, WR-147 and the related testimony of Mr. Cole may be used to supplement or explain other evidence in the record.

Ms. Mrowka referenced spills by New Don Pedro in response to cross-examination questions by Fahey's counsel. (Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016) p. 141:4-7⁶, 142:1-2⁷.) The questions asked whether downstream water right holders could be harmed if Fahey provided water in advance and if Fahey had no control over storage releases. (*Id.*) Other parts of her responses to cross-examination questions do not reference New Don Pedro spilling and are not subject to Fahey's objection. Ironically, this line of questioning by Fahey's counsel is irrelevant. Fahey claims harm is a required element of the Prosecution Team's case in chief. (Fahey Evid. Br., p. 13:12-16.) This is incorrect. Water Code section 1052 requires no such element to prove a trespass. (Water Code § 1052, subd. (a).) The unauthorized diversion or use of water is a trespass against the state and is subject to

⁴ Testimony by Mr. Cole on redirect, with the objection by Mr. Hansen, Fahey's attorney.

⁵ Cross-examination testimony by Mr. Cole in response to questions from Fahey's attorney regarding the "Alleged Spill Testimony."

⁶ In response to a cross-examination question from Fahey's counsel with regard to whether a downstream water right holder could be harmed if Fahey provided replacement water in advance, Ms. Mrowka replied "It's my understanding that the water was no longer resident in the facility. As you heard Mr. Cole testify, there were events, spill events. The water was not there, number one." (Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016) p. 141:4-7.)

 ^{7.)}On cross-examination, Fahey's counsel asking whether a downstream water right holder could be harmed by Fahey's actions if Fahey has no control over when water leaves New Don Pedro. (Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016), p. 141:20-25.) Ms. Mrowka responded "The -- in my opinion, the water isn't there. We had the spill events." (Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016), p. 142:1-2.)

penalty as defined in Water Code section 1052. (*People v. Shirokow* (1980) 26 Cal.3d 301, 304; Water Code § 1052, subd. (c).) Common law definitions of trespass do not apply and no specific showing of harm against a specific party is required. (*see* Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 2016), pp. 129:8-130:9.)

IV. REBUTTAL EXHIBIT WR-153 AND RELATED TESTIMONY IS ADMISSIBLE AND THE PROSECUTION TEAM WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO DISCLOSE WR-153 BEFORE THE HEARING.

In his Post-Hearing Evidence Brief, Fahey objects to the entirety of WR-153 and related testimony regarding the Tuolumne River watershed analysis. (Fahey Evid. Br., pp. 18-19.) However, the post-hearing brief only addresses issues regarding testimony and evidence related to the Tuolumne River watershed analysis. (*Id.*) Furthermore, at the hearing Fahey only objected to slides 3-5, which contained a slide of the Tuolumne River watershed and a graphical depiction of the water supply and demand for the Tuolumne River watershed for 2014 and 2015.⁸ (Hrg. Trans. (Jan. 26, 2016), pp. 1:22-2:16; Petruzzelli Decl., ¶ 15.) Fahey therefore does not dispute anything in WR-153 other than slides 3-5 and testimony related to those slides.

The Prosecution Team relied on the San Joaquin River Basin supply and demand analysis for its case in chief. (WR-7, pp. 2-3 at ¶¶ 7-11; WR-42, 43; Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016), pp. 52:17-53:11.) Since the Tuolumne River is in the San Joaquin River Basin, the analysis for the San Joaquin River Basin included the analysis for the Tuolumne River. (WR-153, slides 3-5; Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 25, 2016), pp. 54:1-9, 88:18-22; Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 26, 2016), pp. 12:5-11.) It included both the supplies and demands for the Tuolumne River and senior demands downstream in the San Joaquin River Basin. (*Id.*) This included Fahey's diversion. (*Id.*) Since the State Water Board informed diverters with rights as senior as 1903 that water was unavailable for their rights at their priorities, Fahey lacked supply for his 1991 and 2011 rights. (WR-9, p. 6 at ¶ 34; WR-7, p. 3 at ¶ 11.) The Prosecution Team later submitted the Tuolumne River analysis as rebuttal evidence to address Fahey's assertion that, even though he diverts from the San Joaquin River Basin, that the San Joaquin River Basin analysis failed to depict supply and demand at his point

⁸ Fahey also objected to WR-153, slide 18, on the basis that it was not presented. Since Fahey did not dispute his ability to pay to pay, the Prosecution Team did not need to present slide 18 and therefore did not dispute Fahey's objection to that slide.

of diversion. (WR-9, pp. 9, 6-7 at ¶¶ 34.) Since the Tuolumne River analysis was based on flows gaged at LaGrange Dam, immediately downstream from New Don Pedro, and similarly showed insufficient supply for rights with much more seniority than Fahey, it similarly showed that water was unavailable for Fahey's rights. (Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 26, 2016), pp. 12:5-13:5, 134:6-7, 134:25-135:2.) Slides 3-5 were properly submitted rebuttal evidence and admissible.

The Prosecution Team did not withhold the content of slides 3-5. It made the map, watershed analyses, and supporting information available before the hearing. As described in great detail in the Prosecution Team's Post-Hearing Evidence Brief, the Tuolumne River watershed analysis information and supporting data was available on the State Water Board watershed analysis webpage. (PT Evid. Br., pp. 15-17.) The link was included in the ACL complaint ("ACLC") and then again provided by electronic mail in response to Fahey's document request. (*Id.* at 16-17, Declaration of Kenneth Petruzzelli in Support of Post-Hearing Evidence Brief ("Petruzzelli Decl."), p. 2 at ¶¶ 2, 7.) The Prosecution Team's counsel even directed Fahey's counsel to the watershed analysis webpage in discussions on the telephone and described the nature of information available through the website. (Petruzzelli Decl., p. 2 at ¶ 6.)

The Prosecution Team response cited by Fahey mischaracterizes the Prosecution Team's position, as the Prosecution Team was responding specifically to a request for documents supporting the ACLC. (Petruzzelli Decl., Attach. 1.) The Prosecution Team also responded to a subsequent question about the San Joaquin River Basin watershed analysis referenced in the ACLC by directing Fahey's counsel to the watershed analysis webpage and explaining supporting datasets and analysis were also available through the webpage, stating –

The "graphical summations" referenced in Item 26, pages 4 through 5, of the ACL complaint are available on the State Water Board's "Watershed Analysis" webpage at http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/dr

ought/analysis/, along with supporting datasets and analysis. Another water supply graph is available on the "Notices of Water Availability" webpage under "San Joaquin River Watershed" for April 23, 2015 at http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/dr ought/docs/water_availability/sjglobal_apr212015.pdf.

(Petruzzelli Decl., Attach. 1.)

Fahey and his attorneys had over four months to find the map and charts in slides

3-5 on the webpage. The information could have been found easily with any reasonable effort. Fahey's attorneys allege *Fahey* could not find the Tuolumne River watershed analysis, but they do not allege that *they* could not find it.

Finally, the January 21, 2016 Order only applied to the case in chief. (January 21, 2016 Order, p. 10; Hrg. Trns. (Jan. 26, 2016), p. 1:10-13.) It did not apply to anything the Prosecution Team potentially would have submitted on rebuttal. (*Id.*) It also did not require the Prosecution Team to disclose documents it had already disclosed or otherwise made available, which with respect to the content in slides 3-5 it already had.

WR-153, including slides 3-5 and related testimony, is admissible.

V. CONCLUSION

Fahey's arguments about the Raker Act, the Fourth Agreement, and D995's obsolescence are not relevant to whether an unlawful diversion occurred, because they are not relevant to his priority of right or whether water was available for his priority of right. They are also not relevant to whether Fahey had an additional right that would have authorized his diversions, because none of them establish any additional right such as a storage right or the equivalent. Fahey even denied having such a right.

WR-147 and the associated testimonies of Sam Cole and Kathy Mrowka are also admissible and were not wrongfully withheld. WR-147 and Mr. Cole's testimony supplements and explains other evidence for the purpose of attacking Mr. Fahey's credibility. In addition, as rebuttal evidence the Prosecution Team was not required to disclose WR-147 with its case in chief and, as attorney work product WR-147 was privileged until the Prosecution Team chose to waive that privilege by disclosing WR-147.

Finally, WR-153, including slides 3-5, is admissible. It was rebuttal evidence and properly submitted as rebuttal in response to Fahey's assertions that the San Joaquin River Basin watershed analysis failed to depict the supply and demand at his point of diversion. Fahey claims the Prosecution Team also wrongfully withheld these documents, but they were made available to Fahey long before the hearing. They were not withheld.

Respectfully submitted,

Kenneth Petruzzelli OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT Attorney for the Prosecution Team

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