Barbara A. Brenner (SBN 142222) Kerry A. Fuller (SBN 292466) 2 CHURCHWELL WHITE LLP 1414 K Street, 3<sup>rd</sup> Floor 3 Sacramento, CA 95814 (916) 468-0950 Phone 4 (916) 468-0951 Fax barbara@churchwellwhite.com 5 Attorneys for Respondents 6 DOUGLAS COLE, HEIDI COLE, AND MARBLE MOUNTAIN RANCH 7 BEFORE THE CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD 8 9 10 In the Matter of Douglas Cole and Heidi Cole and Marble Mountain Ranch, Draft Order No. 11 2017-00XX-DWR 12 13 14 15 16 I. Introduction

RESPONSE TO PROSECUTION TEAM'S OPPOSITION TO DIVERTER'S OBJECTIONS TO TESTIMONY SUBMITTED BY THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND WILDLIFE, THE KARUK TRIBE, THE NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, OLD MAN RIVER TRUST, AND KLAMATH RIVERKEEPERS

Douglas and Heidi Cole (the "Coles") and Marble Mountain Ranch (the "Ranch") provide this response to the State Water Resources Control Board ("State Water Board"), Division of Water Rights, Prosecution Team's ("Prosecution Team") opposition to the Coles' objections to the California Department of Fish and Wildlife ("DFW"), the Karuk Tribe, the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"), Old Man River Trust, and Klamath Riverkeepers (collectively, "Related Parties").

First, the Prosecution Team's response is inapplicable to the Coles' objections. The Coles' objections were raised to the Related Parties' Exhibits, not the Prosecution Team's. The Prosecution Team fails to address how it represents the Related Parties' interest in this matter, thereby, providing it with standing to submit the opposition served on Monday, October 16, 2017. The Prosecution Team served its Opposition to Diverters' Objections to Testimony Submitted by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife, the Karuk Tribe, the National Marine Fisheries

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Service, Old Man River Trust, and Klamath Riverkeepers ("Prosecution Team's Opposition"), to which this reply responds on October 16, 2017, before the Coles' objections to the Prosecution Team's Exhibits were served. The Prosecution Team's Opposition should be stricken as it lacks standing to oppose the Coles' objections.

Alternatively, the Coles submit this reply to the Prosecution Team's Opposition in the event the Prosecution Team's Opposition is not stricken for lack of standing.

II. Evidence Related to the Determination of the Coles' Pre-1914 Three Cubic Feet Per Second Right is Irrelevant to the Use of the Coles' Diversion and Use of Water as it Relates to Public Trust Resources.

The Prosecution Team asserts that "a threshold assessment of the scope and extent of the [Coles'] pre-1914" right is within the State Water Board's authority. (Prosecution Team's Opposition, 2:21-22.) The case the Prosecution Team cites, *Young v. State Water Resources Control Board* (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 397 ("*Young*"), for this proposition, does provide the State Water Board with the jurisdiction to make the threshold assessment of a pre-1914 water right. However, in this case, the State Water Board has already made that initial determination of the Coles' pre-1914 water right. Determining the scope of the Coles' pre-1914 right was the focus of the over 20-year investigation and negotiation process between all stakeholders, including the State Water Board, that culminated in the statement in the Division of Water Rights, Report of Inspection of the 12-17-2014 and 2-12-2015 Inspections ("Report of Inspection") at the Ranch that found:

The State Water Board or a reviewing court could reasonably conclude that [the Ranch and the Coles] pre-1914 water right may be up to the full capacity of the ditch, which [the Ranch and the Coles] claims to be 3 cfs. On that basis, the Division concludes that [the Ranch and the Coles'] diversions do not appear to be in excess of its claimed pre-1914 water right.

(Report of Inspection, p. 14.) Thus, the State Water Board has already exercised its jurisdiction, as established under *Young*, to make an initial determination of the Coles' pre-1914 water right and found that it is "up to the full capacity of the ditch," or three cubic feet per second ("cfs"). (Report of Inspection, p. 14.) Consequently, the process of addressing the Coles' water right in this case has been bifurcated. First, the Coles' pre-1914 three cfs right was determined, and now, through this public hearing, the reasonableness of the Coles' use of that pre-1914 three cfs right is to be

determined. Therefore, all Exhibits submitted to challenge the Coles' established three cfs right, by either the Prosecution Team or the Related Parties, are irrelevant to the issue of the hearing: whether the Coles are engaged in waste, unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion specifically as it relates to public trust resources through their diversion and use of water at the Ranch. (See Notice of Public Hearing, pp. 1-2.)

Additionally, the three items of precedential material the Prosecution Team relies upon: Young, Water Right Decision 1600, and Water Right Order 2012-004, to assert that the scope and extent of the Coles' pre-1914 three cfs water right are properly within the scope of this public hearing are clearly not applicable to the circumstances of this hearing or do not stand for the proposition the Prosecution Team asserts. First, Young, which confirmed the State Water Board's authority to make a threshold assessment of a riparian or pre-1914 water right, involved a public hearing to determine the amount of a diverter's claim of a pre-1914 right where it was alleged the diverter was engaged in an unauthorized diversion of water. (Young, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 400.) The Coles are not engaged in an unauthorized diversion of water, their pre-1914 three cfs water right has been established through the over 20-year investigation and negotiation process with stakeholders. (See Report of Inspection, p. 14.)

Further, in *Young*, the State Water Board was acting under its authority pursuant to Water Code section 1831 to issue a cease and desist order for the unauthorized diversion or use of water. (*Young, supra*, 219 Cal.App.4th at pp. 400-401.) In this matter, the State Water Board asserts its authority under Water Code section 275 to potentially issue an order finding a waste, unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion. (See Water Code § 275; Notice of Public Hearing, pp. 1-2; Draft Order WR 2017-00XX-DWR ("Draft Order"), p. 1.) Therefore, the determination of the scope and extent of the Coles' pre-1914 three cfs water right has not only already been initially determined, but is outside the scope of the authority underlying the Draft Order which serves as the basis of this public hearing. (Draft Order, p. 1.)

The Prosecution Team also offers Water Right Decision 1600 and Water Right Order 2012-004 to assert that the determination of the scope and extent of the Coles' pre-1914 three cfs water right is properly within the determination of this public hearing. However, in relying upon

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Water Right Decision 1600 and Water Right Order 2012-004, the Prosecution Team acknowledges that in Water Right Decision 1600 "the State Water Board proceeded to survey the various bases for [Imperial Irrigation District's] right to divert and use water" and that Water Right Order 2012-004 "began with an extensive discussion of the construction and operation of Hidden Lakes Estates and discussed the bases of right for diverting and using water." (Prosecution Team's Opposition, 2:12-13, 2:16-18.) Neither Water Right Decision 1600 nor Water Right Order 2012-004 reviewed the water rights of the diverters in those matters to determine the scope and extent of the rights claimed. (See Water Right Decision 1600, p. 9; Water Right Order 2012-004, p. 4, fn. 4.)

Reviewing the bases of a water right is not the same as determining the scope and extent of that right. Therefore, neither Water Right Decision 1600 nor Water Right Order 2012-004 provide the Prosecution Team or any of the Related Parties with the opportunity to use the public hearing to address the scope or extent of the Coles' pre-1914 three cfs water right.

In summary, *Young* provides the State Water Board with the authority to make "a threshold"

In summary, *Young* provides the State Water Board with the authority to make "a threshold assessment of the scope and extent" of a pre-1914 right. (*Young, supra*, 219 Cal.App.4th 397.) However, that threshold assessment has already been made. Further, the State Water Board's asserted authority for the public hearing in this matter only addresses the reasonableness of the Coles' diversion and use of water. In *Young*, the State Water Board was exercising its authority under Water Code section 1831 to issue a cease and desist order for the unauthorized diversion and use of water. The Draft Order here relies on Water Code section 275 to determine the Coles' reasonableness of the use of their pre-1914 three cfs water right.

Finally, neither Water Right Decision 1600 nor Water Right Order 2012-004 provides the State Water Board with the authority to consider the scope and extent of the Coles' pre-1914 three cfs water right. Therefore, any of the Prosecution Team's or Related Parties' Exhibits that address the scope and extent Coles' pre-1914 three cfs water right are irrelevant to the issue of this public hearing, which is, the Coles' diversion and use of water at the Ranch, as it relates to public trust resources.

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III. The Notice of Public Hearing Specifies that this Public Hearing is Limited to a Determination of the Reasonableness of the Coles' Diversion and Use of Water Under Water Code Section 275. It Would be a Violation of the Coles' Due Process Right to Expand the Scope of the Public Hearing to the Basis of the Coles' Pre-1914 Water Right Under Young.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7, of the California Constitution, an individual must be provided with the due process of "'notice and [the] opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' "before he or she may be deprived of an interest in life, liberty, or property. (Koshak v. Malek (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1547 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 313.) In order to provide the requisite notice under the requirements of due process, the notice must be "'reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.'" (Ibid.) A vested property right to use water, such as the Coles' pre-1914 three cfs right, may not "be infringed [upon] by others or taken by governmental action without due process ...." (United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 82, 101.)

The Notice of Public Hearing limits the purpose of the public hearing to a hearing "to receive evidence relevant to determining whether ... [the Coles] have diverted and used water or are continuing to divert and use water in a manner that constitutes a waste, unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion." (Notice of Public Hearing, p.

- 1.) Further, the Notice of Public Hearing limits the "key issues to be addressed at the hearing" to:
  - 1) Does the past or current diversion or use of water by Douglas and Heidi Cole and Marble Mountain Ranch constitute a waste, unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion of water, particularly in light of any impacts to public trust resources?
  - 2) If the past or current diversion or use of water by Douglas and Heidi Cole and Marble Mountain Ranch constitutes a waste, unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion of water, what corrective actions, if any, should be implemented, and with what time schedule should they be implemented? How should the implementation time schedule for any corrective actions be coordinated with the requirements of the Cleanup and Abatement Order issued by the North Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board?

(*Ibid.*) The Draft Order, underlying the Notice of Public Hearing, relies on the State Water Board's authority under Water Code section 275 to potentially issue the Draft Order as a final order, following the public hearing. Water Code section 275 grants the State Water Board the authority to "take all appropriate proceedings and actions ... to prevent waste, unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion of water in this state."

None of these materials provide notice to the Coles that the scope and extent of their pre1914 three cfs water right are part of the issues to be determined through this public hearing.

Nowhere does the Prosecution Team or the State Water Board assert that it is engaged in a determination of the scope or extent of the Coles' pre-1914 water right, nor do they provide any statutory authority to engage in that determination in the Notice of Public Hearing or related materials provided for the public hearing. Therefore, where determinations made at the public hearing include the scope and extent of the Coles' pre-1914 three cfs water right under *Young*, the Coles have not been provided with notice of "the pendency of the action and afforded ... an opportunity to present their objections' as required under their Constitutional due process rights. (Koshak v. Malek, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1547 [quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 314].) Consequently, if the Coles' objections are not granted and the public hearing includes a determination of the scope and extent of the Coles' pre-1914 three cfs right, the Coles' due process rights will be violated.

## IV. Hearsay Evidence is Inadmissible where the Truth of the Matter Asserted within the Evidence is Used to Make a Finding.

The Prosecution Team does not provide, specifically, which Exhibits of the Related Parties to which it opposes the Coles' objections, instead asserting that the objections are improper under the requirements of Government Code section 11513. The Coles' objections to the Related Parties' Exhibits as hearsay provide that the Exhibits, where they are used for the truth of the matter asserted in that Exhibit, making that Exhibit hearsay evidence, are not admissible to support a finding as provided in Government Code section 11513(d). The Prosecution Team does not provide any information to indicate that the Exhibits the Coles objected to are provided for any other reason than for the truth of the matters asserted within them to make a finding. Therefore,

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the Prosecution Team's Opposition fails to assert any reason not to find that each of the Related Parties' Exhibits to which the Coles have objected should be stricken. Therefore, the Coles' motion to strike each of the Exhibits identified in their objections to the Related Parties' Exhibits should be granted.

## V. Conclusion

The Prosecution Team fails to show that it represents the Related Parties' interests in this matter. Therefore, the Prosecution Team's Opposition should be stricken. However, to address the issues the Prosecution Team's Opposition raises the Coles provide this response.

The scope and extent of the Coles' pre-1914 three cfs water right is outside the scope of this hearing. The State Water Board has already exercised its discretion to make a threshold assessment of the Coles' pre-1914 three cfs right and the basis of the hearing under the Draft Order does not extend to the scope of the Coles' pre-1914 three cfs water right. The public hearing's purpose is only to determine whether the Coles are engaged in a waste, unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion of the water under their pre-1914 three cfs water right, as it relates to public trust resources. Further, allowing the determination of the Coles' pre-1914 three cfs water right at this public hearing violates the Coles' due process rights because they have not been provided notice that such a determination is to be made at this public hearing.

Finally, the Prosecution Team has failed to allege that any of the Related Parties' Exhibits to which the Coles have objected are submitted for any other purpose than for the truth of the matter asserted to make a finding based on that Exhibit. Therefore, the Coles' motion to strike those Exhibits should be granted.

Dated: October 18, 2017

CHURCHWELL WHITE LLP

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