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12	BE	FOR	E THE
13	CALIFORNIA STATE WATI	ER R	RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD
14	HEARING IN THE MATTER OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER)	OBJECTIONS OF THE COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY
15	RESOURCES AND UNITED STATES BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REQUEST)	FLOOD CONTROL AND WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT, AND
16	FOR A CHANGE IN POINT OF DIVERSION FOR CALIFORNIA WATER)	MOKELUMNE RIVER WATER AND POWER AUTHORITY TO WRITTEN
17	FIX)	TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS SUBMITTED BY PETITIONERS; JOINDER
18			IN WRITTEN OBJECTIONS SUBMITTED BY OTHER PROTESTANTS
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SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY PROTESTANTS' OBJECTIONS TO WRITTEN TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS; JOINDER IN WRITTEN OBJECTIONS SUBMITTED BY OTHER PROTESTANTS

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I. INTRODUCTION

Protestants County of San Joaquin, San Joaquin County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, and Mokelumne River Water and Power Authority (collectively, the "San Joaquin County Protestants"), respectfully submit the following objections to the written testimony and other evidence proffered by Petitioners California Department of Water Resources ("DWR") and the United States Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclamation") (collectively, "Petitioners") in support of the Petition for Change in the Point of Diversion. The San Joaquin County Protestants also join in, adopt, and incorporate by reference the objections and motions to exclude evidence submitted by other Protestants identified below.

II. SCOPE AND CONTEXT OF THE SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY PROTESTANTS' PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The State Board's October 30, 2015 Notice of Petition explains that Part 1 of the WaterFix Hearing "focus[es] on the potential effects of the Petition on agricultural, municipal, and industrial uses of water and associated legal users of water and conditions that should be placed on any approval of the Petition to protect those uses." (SWRCB Notice of Petition, p. 2.) The State Board identified the key issues to be decided in Part 1 as follows:

- (1) Will the changes proposed in the Petition in effect initiate a new water right?
- (2) Will the proposed changes cause injury to any municipal, industrial or agricultural uses of water, including associated legal users of water?
 - a. Will the proposed changes in points of diversion alter water flows in a manner that causes injury to municipal, industrial, or agricultural uses of water?
 - b. Will the proposed changes in points of diversion alter water quality in a manner that causes injury to municipal, industrial, or agricultural uses of water?
 - c. If so, what specific conditions, if any, should the State Water Board include in any approval of the Petition to avoid injury to these uses?

(SWRCB Notice of Petition, p. 11.)

Petitioners bear the heavy burden of proof in this matter. In Part 1A of the WaterFix Hearing, that means, at the very least, that the Petition must "[i]nclude sufficient information to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the proposed change will not injure any other legal user of water." (Wat. Code § 1701.2(d); see, also, Wat. Code § 1701.3(b)(1) [Board may request additional information

"needed to demonstrate that the change will not injure any other legal user of water."].) Unless and until Petitioners meet this "no injury" standard of proof – i.e., unless and until they establish their prima facie case – the Protestants are under no obligation whatsoever to come forward with any affirmative evidence or argument to establish the likelihood of injury to legal users of water.

The objections set forth below apply only to written testimony and other evidence submitted on May 31, 2016 by Petitioners in connection with Part 1 of the WaterFix Hearing. The San Joaquin County Protestants reserve all rights to object to additional evidence Petitioners may later proffer in connection with Part 1, as well to any evidence Petitioners may submit in connection with Part 2 of the WaterFix Hearing, which is to "focus on the potential effects of the Petition on fish and wildlife and recreational uses and conditions that should be placed on any approval of the Petition to protect those uses, including consideration of appropriate Delta flow criteria for the California WaterFix Project." (SWRCB Notice of Petition, p. 12.)

In submitting these Objections, the San Joaquin County Protestants are mindful of the State Board's June 10, 2016 Ruling with respect to the Objections due on July 12, 2016:

[O]nly objections that, if valid, would preclude petitioners' witnesses from testifying must be submitted by [July 12]. At a minimum, any motions to disqualify any of petitioners' witnesses, or to exclude a witness's testimony, in whole or in part, must be filed and served on petitioners and the other parties by 12:00 noon on July 12, 2016. The parties are strongly encouraged, but not required, to submit any other procedural or evidentiary objections by ... July 12 For example, objections concerning petitioners' exhibits, or objections that go to the weight that should be afforded petitioners' testimony or exhibits, but not their admissibility, may be made after the July 12, 2016 deadline, although we would prefer to receive all objections in writing by 12:00 noon July 12, 2016.

(SWRCB's June 10, 2016 Ruling, p. 2.) Accordingly, the Objections stated herein include the Objections that would disqualify or otherwise preclude Petitioners' witnesses from testifying, in whole or in part, as well as some objections which, if sustained, might not result in exclusion of evidence, but, rather, would go to the weight of the evidence or result in restricted use of the evidence. That said, consistent with the June 10 Ruling, the San Joaquin County Protestants reserve their right to make further and additional evidentiary objections as evidence is offered by Petitioners during Part 1 of the WaterFix Hearing.

III. PROCEDURAL OBJECTIONS

A. This Hearing Should Not Proceed until the Final EIR/EIS Has Issued and the Parties Have Been Afforded an Opportunity to Review the Final EIR/EIS.

Jointly with the Central Delta Water Agency and the South Delta Water Agency, in October, 2015, the San Joaquin County Protestants submitted substantive and detailed comments to the Partially Recirculated Draft Environmental Impact Report/Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement ("RDEIR/SDEIS"). Those comments, and comments submitted by many other parties, have yet to be addressed. The Petitioners must address those comments in a final EIR/EIS, which will certainly contain detailed information regarding operational criteria and the Bay-Delta Plan Update. The final EIR/EIS will almost certainly result in substantial further evaluation of the impacts and alternatives which received little or no evaluation, or plainly deficient analysis, in the RDEIR/SDEIS.

Without the final EIR/EIS, information essential to a responsible evaluation of the issues to be addressed in Part 1 will not be available to Protestants, nor will Petitioners be in a position to even begin to meet their burden of proving that the change petition includes sufficient information to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the proposed change will not injure any other legal use of water. For the same reason, until the final EIR/EIS is adopted and the Protestants have had sufficient opportunity to evaluate the changes made to address the comments to the RDEIR/SDEIS, it will be inappropriate and contrary to law for this Board to process the Petition or to conduct the evidentiary hearing.

Notwithstanding the hearing officers' rejection of this procedural objection in the February 11, 2016 Pre-Hearing Conference Ruling (pp. 1-2), the San Joaquin County Protestant reassert this Objection and request that this hearing be postponed to allow for review of the final EIR/EIS.

B. As Currently Structured, This Proceeding Unfairly and Unlawfully Shifts the Burden of Proof and Persuasion with Respect to "No Injury" from the Petitioners to the Protestants.

Water Code § 1701.2 provides that prior to any approval of a change petition, the petitioner must establish that the change will not operate to the injury of any legal user of the water involved. The same requirement appears again in Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 791(a) ["After notice of an application to appropriate water has been given pursuant to Article 3, changes in point of diversion,

place of use, or purpose of use as stated in the application, permit, or license may be allowed only upon petition and provided that the petitioner establishes that the proposed change(s) will neither in effect initiate a new right nor injure any other legal user of water."]. As a matter of law, the Petitioners bear the burden of establishing "no injury."

However, Petitioners in this proceeding are relying on the State Board to identify and require mitigation measures to prevent injury to other legal users. Although Petitioners' proffered written testimony refers to the "no injury" test in a number of places, it offers no analysis of the "no injury" question. That was, of course, supposed to be the overriding issue in the Part 1A, but the hearing has been structured, apparently, on the expectation that the Protestants must make an affirmative showing of injury.

As noted, unless and until Petitioners satisfy by competent evidence their burden of establishing the likelihood of "no injury" to legal users of water, the Protestants are under no obligation at all to put on an affirmative case. By going forward with the WaterFix Hearing as currently structured, the State Board is effectively requiring Protestants to do just that. The net effect is to shift the burden of proof and persuasion with respect to "no injury" from the Petitioners, i.e., to allow Petitioners to avoid their burden of proof.

C. This Hearing Should Not Proceed until the State Board has Completed its Review and Update of the Bay-Delta Water Quality Control Plan.

This hearing is premature, also, because the State Board must complete its review and update of the Bay-Delta Water Quality Control Plan prior to considering approval of the Petition. The use of current flow standards, D-1641, or interim Delta flow criteria cannot meet the Board's statutory obligation under the 2009 Delta Reform Act to include "appropriate Delta flow criteria" protective of beneficial and public trust resources in any order approving a change such as that at issue here. (Water Code § 85086(c)(2).)

IV. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

- A. Overview of Rules Governing Admissibility of Evidence in this Proceeding
 - 1. The State Board's October 30, 2015 Notice of Petition

The State Board explained in its October 30, 2015 Notice of Petition and Notice of Public

Hearing that evidence proffered in this proceeding will be admitted in accordance with Gov. Code §11513. Although section 11513 provides that in administrative hearings the technical rules relating to evidence and witnesses need not be strictly applied, relevant evidence must be "the sort of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs." (Gov. Code, § 11513(c).) In the administrative hearing context, "the evidence must be relevant and reliable." (Aengst v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 275, 283.) The applicable SWRCB regulation (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 648(b)) incorporates Evidence Code sections 801-805; Water Code § 1100 incorporates the Civil Discovery Act (Code Civ. Proc. § 2016.010 et seq.).

Consistent with Gov. Code § 11513(d), the Notice of Petition also states: "Hearsay evidence may be used to supplement or explain other evidence, but over timely objection shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in a civil action." (Notice of Petition, p. 36.)

The State Board's October 30, 2015 Notice of Petition also directed the parties to comply with the requirement that all "[e]xhibits based on technical studies or models shall be accompanied by sufficient information to clearly identify and explain the logic, assumptions, development, and operation of the studies or models." (Notice of Petition, p. 33.)

2. The February 11 Pre-Hearing Conference Ruling.

In its February 11, 2016 Pre-Hearing Conference Ruling, the hearing officers for the California WaterFix Petition Hearing observed that the information provided by Petitioners "lacks clarity in several ways, including whether operational criteria are intended to constrain project operations or are identified for modeling purposes only, areas where a specific operational component or mitigation measure is not yet chosen or identified, operational parameters that are not defined and deferred to an adaptive management process, and lack of clarity concerning some mitigation measures." (February 11, 2016 Ruling, p. 6.) The hearing officers directed Petitioners to provide the information required by California Code of Regulations, title 23, § 794(a) "in a succinct and easily identifiable format." (February 11, 2016 Ruling, p. 7.) Information required by section 794(a) includes proposed diversion, release and return flow schedules and identification in quantitative terms of any projected change in water quantity, water quality, timing of diversion or use, consumptive use

of the water, reduction in return flows, or reduction in the availability of water within the streams affected by the proposed change(s). (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 794(a)(6) and (a)(9).)

3. Rules Applicable to Expert Testimony, Generally.

While application of the rules in this Hearing may be relaxed in comparison to their application in court proceedings, the rules governing admissibility of expert testimony are themselves well established. Obviously, the witness must be qualified to testify as an expert. (*People v. Chavez* (1985) 39 Cal.3d 823, 827-829.) It follows that proffered expert testimony must be excluded where the witness's qualifications do not extend to the subject matter at issue, i.e., where the proffered testimony is beyond the scope of the witness's expertise. (Evid. Code § 720 [The witness must be qualified, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, as an expert in the appropriate field.]; *People v. Ramos* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1174-1175.)

A proper objection lies where the question does not require or lend itself to expert testimony. This follows from the rule that the subject matter at issue must require expert testimony because it is outside the common knowledge and experience of ordinary jurors. (Evid. Code § 801; *People v. Ochoa* (2000) 26 Cal.4th 398, 437; *People v. Valdez* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 494, 506.) Expert opinion should not be admitted if persons of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness. (*People v. McDonald* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 367.)

Nor may expert testimony be admitted where its admission would usurp the role of the trier of fact or of those charge with making legal determinations. (*Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co.* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1183 [witness was not allowed to give opinions on law].) Allowing an expert to give an opinion on a question of law usurps the role of the trial judge, and the evidence is incompetent. (*Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker* (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863 [not proper in malicious prosecution action for attorney-witnesses to opine as to whether a reasonable attorney would conclude there was probable cause to file an action]; *Cooper Companies v. Transcontinental Ins. Co.* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1094 [expert testimony on the interpretation of an insurance contract is inappropriate]; *Asplund v. Selected Investments* (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 26, 50 [The existence and scope of a defendant's duty to supervise an agent is a legal question, and an expert may not give an opinion in an area that is within the province of the court to decide.].)

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As reflected in the State Board's October 30, 2015 Notice of Petition, expert witnesses may rely on hearsay evidence, the work of others, test results and measurements from procedures conducted by others, and other material that they themselves did not produce. However, the underlying work, writings, measurements, and other underlying evidence must not be unreliable, speculative, improper hearsay, or otherwise inadmissible. Accordingly, in the context of the WaterFix Hearing, proffered expert testimony must be excluded where it is based on matter of a type on which an expert may not reasonably rely or where its is unsupported by the material on which the expert relies. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal. 4th 747. 771-772.) Proffered expert testimony must be excluded if it is speculative or based on assumptions not support by the record. (Ibid.; Long v. Cal-Western States Life Insurance (1955) 43 Cal.2d 871, 882 [speculative or conjectural data are not properly the subject of expert testimony]; Korsak v. Atlas Hotels, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal. App. 4th 1516, 1524-1525 [If the expert uses hearsay as the basis for an opinion, it should be reliable and necessary and not conjecture or speculation, and the expert must not testify to the out-of-court statements as independent facts.].) Expert testimony must be excluded or accorded no weight where the basis for the opinion reflects an unacceptable level of uncertainty, speculation and guesswork. (Westrec Marina Management, Inc. v. Jardine Ins. Brokers Orange County, Inc. (2000) 85 Cal. App. 4th 1042, 1051.)

4. Applicability of the Kelly/Frye Rule in Administrative Hearings.

Proffered expert testimony must be excluded if it is not based on principles or procedures that have gained general acceptance in their field. (*Frye v. United States* (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013; *People v. Kelly* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24; *People v. Leahy* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 594.) In California, the *Kelly* rule, also known as the "general acceptance test," allows for the admission of expert opinion grounded in a scientific theory or technique only if the theory or technique is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community. Under this rule, evidence based on a new scientific method must satisfy three requirements to be admissible: (1) the technique has gained general acceptance in its field; (2) the witness furnishing the testimony is qualified to give evidence on the acceptance of the technique; and (3) correct scientific procedures were used. (*People v. Diaz* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 526.) "It is the proponent of [the expert] testimony, of course, who has the burden of

making the necessary showing of compliance with *Frye*, i.e., of demonstrating by means of qualified and disinterested experts that the new technique is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community." (*People* v. *Shirley* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18, 54, citing *People v. Kelly, supra*, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 36-40; accord, *Seering v. Department of Social Services* (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 298, 311.)

The San Joaquin County Protestants recognize that the State Board has at times taken the position that the *Kelly/Frye* rule does not apply to the Board's administrative proceedings. (See SWRCB's March 18, 2016 "Ruling on the Following Motions Filed in the Matters of Administrative Civil Liability (ACL) Complaint Against Byron-Bethany Irrigation District (BBID) and Draft Cease and Desist Order (CDO) Against The West Side Irrigation District (WSID)," at p. 3.) The rationale for not applying the *Kelly/Frye* rule in this context is that in administrative proceedings the danger of a lay-jury being misled or unduly prejudiced by such evidence does not exist. (*Ibid.*)

Respectfully, however, such past statements by the State Board cannot withstand scrutiny under prevailing California law. In *Seering v. Department of Social Services, supra,* 194 Cal.App.3d 298, the court rejected the Department of Social Services' argument that the *Kelly/Frye* rule does not apply in administrative proceedings, explaining:

While it is true that an administrative hearing "need not be conducted according to technical rules relating to evidence and witnesses" and that hearsay is admissible in such a hearing (see Gov. Code, § 11513, subd. (c)), we conclude that the purpose of the *Kelly-Frye* rule will be served by applying it in this context. In *Amber B*. and *Christine C*., the court was concerned that the trial judge in a dependency hearing might be misled by the "aura of infallibility" that may surround unproven scientific methods and might "ascribe an inordinately high degree of certainty" to the expert's opinion. We see no reason why an administrative law judge in a proceeding to revoke a license, and later a trial judge reviewing the administrative record under the independent judgment standard, would be any less likely to be misled by the "aura of infallibility" with which the courts have been concerned. Consequently, we reject the contention that the *Kelly-Frye* rule should not apply in a proceeding such as this.

(194 Cal.App.3d at p. 310.)

Since Seering v. Department of Social Sciences was decided, agencies' contentions that the Kelly/Frye rule does not apply in such administrative proceedings has been rejected by the courts. (See, e.g., Texaco Producing v. County of Kern (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th, 1029, 1047-1048 [rejecting the agency's contention that Kelly/Frye does not apply in administrative proceedings but then

declining to apply *Kelly/Frye* on other grounds]; *Harris Transportation Co. v. Air Resources Board* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1478 ["We agree as a general matter the *Kelly* standard is applicable to administrative proceedings."].)

B. Objection to Petitioners' Reliance on CalSim II Modeling, Generally.

In the context of the WaterFix Petition Hearing, the most obvious *Kelly/Frye* issues arise in connection with the Petitioners' witnesses' reliance on CalSim II modeling and other models that rely on CalSim II. CalSim II is also subject to objection on the ground that it lacks foundation, relies on speculation and does not have sufficient indicia of reliability to be properly applied in the context of this proceeding.

Although CalSim II might not be considered "new" in some circles, it does not pass the general acceptance test. As stated in the CalSim II Strategic Review conducted in 2003:

There has not been a sufficiently systematic, transparent, and accessible approach to the development and use of hydrologic, water demand, capacity, and operational data for CALSIM II. . . . The administration of data development is fragmented, disintegrated, and lacks a coherent technical or administrative framework.

(A Strategic Review of CALSIM II and its Use for Water Planning, Management, and Operations in Central California, Attachment 1, p. 20 (December 4, 2003).) The Petitioners agreed:

The validity of data inputs impacts both model results and model credibility. The greatest concern is the validity of the hydrologic inputs and parameters. Concern is compounded by the current lack of complete documentation. Over the last two years DWR and Reclamation have attempted to document model inputs. Reclamation is currently documenting the current CalSim-II hydrology procedures. This effort needs to be extended and updated.

(Peer Review Response: A Report by DWR/Reclamation in Reply to the Peer Review of the CalSim II Model Sponsored by the CALFED Science Program in December 2003, Attachment 2, p. 12.)

Subsequent reports have been similarly critical of the CalSim II model, and the San Joaquin County Protestants are not aware of any thorough peer review process under which the current CalSim II has passed muster. None of the prior peer reviews of CalSim II appear to have been submitted with the modeling evidence that would be essential for validating the model for any specific use. Against this backdrop, Petitioners' use of CalSim II as a core foundational basis for a proposed project of this magnitude is unsupportable.

Further, the San Joaquin County Protestants understand that Petitioners have not provided the

detailed information regarding the CalSim II model requested by the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations and the Institute for Fisheries Resources. While that information would not have been an adequate substitute for a thorough and proper peer review of the current version of CalSim II, it might have provided at least some basis for evaluating Petitioners' use of CalSim II in the WaterFix context.

For these reasons, Petitioners' reliance on CalSim II lacks foundation, is speculative, and cannot pass muster under the *Kelly/Frye* test. Because reliance on CalSim II modeling is more or less ubiquitous throughout Petitioners' May 31, 2016 case-in-chief written submissions, the San Joaquin County Protestants object to Petitioners' use of CalSim II, and other models that rely on CalSim II, to support the Petition. This blanket objection is in addition to specific objections to Petitioners' use of CalSim II in the Objections chart below.

C. Objections to Specific Written Testimony and Exhibits Proffered by Petitioners.

The San Joaquin County Protestants object to the following written testimony and exhibits

proffered by Petitioners on the following grounds.

EXHIBIT	OBJECTION
DWR-3, at pp. 8-9, 16-17	Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions in the guise of expert testimony (Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69 Cal. App. 4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material.
DWR-4, at p. 38	Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions in the guise of expert testimony (Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69 Cal. App. 4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material.
DWR-5, at pp. 16-17, 28-82	A. Lacks foundation and based on facts not in evidence or which are speculative in nature. The proffered opinion testimony is based on inadequate, unreliable, or speculative underlying factual assumptions, data and modeling. This evidence fails to satisfy the Notice of Petition's requirement that evidence "clearly identify and explain the logic, assumptions, development, and operation of the studies or models" relied upon. Insofar as this testimony relies on CalSim II modeling, it should also be excluded under the <i>Kellyl Frye</i> rule. B. Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions (<i>Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co.</i> (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material.

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1	EXHIBIT	OBJECTION	
2 3 4 5 6 7	DWR-51, at pp. 10:7-16; 12:14-16; 13:17- 14:9, 14:21-17:3 (Pierre Testimony)	A. Lacks foundation and based on facts not in evidence or which are speculative in nature (e.g., Ms. Pierre's reliance on the adaptive management plan). The proffered opinion testimony is based on inadequate, unreliable, or speculative underlying factual assumptions, data and modeling. This evidence fails to satisfy the Notice of Petition's requirement that evidence "clearly identify and explain the logic, assumptions, development, and operation of the studies or models" relied upon. Insofar as this testimony relies on CalSim II modeling, it should also be excluded under the <i>Kellyl Frye</i> rule.	
8 9 10		B. Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions in the guise of expert testimony (Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material.	
11 12 13 14 15	DWR-53, at pp. 8:17-19, 11:20-12:16 (Sergent Testimony)	Lacks foundation and based on facts not in evidence or which are speculative in nature. The proffered opinion testimony is based on inadequate, unreliable, or speculative underlying factual assumptions, data and modeling. This evidence fails to satisfy the Notice of Petition's requirement that evidence "clearly identify and explain the logic, assumptions, development, and operation of the studies or models" relied upon. Insofar as this testimony relies on CalSim II modeling, it should also be excluded under the <i>Kellyl Frye</i> rule.	
16 17 18	DWR-53, at pp. 3:22-25, 8:13-21, 8:25-9:1, 10:24-15:11 (esp. 11:10-13), 24:5-28 (Sergent Testimony)	Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions in the guise of expert testimony (Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material.	
19 20 21	DWR-53, at pp. 11:10-13; 17:23-18:4 (Sergent Testimony)	Evidence Code § 1523 (secondary evidence rule); DWR has possession or control of the referenced writings, which are the best and most reliable evidence of their content; a responsible trier of fact would not rely on secondary evidence of their content under these circumstances.	
22 23	DWR 61, at pp. 5:23-25, 6:6-8, 7:18-27, 8:1-8, 16:9-15, 17:5-11, 17:23-25, 19:15-26, 20:6-18 (Leahigh Testimony)	Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions in the guise of expert testimony (Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material.	
24 25	DWR 61, at pp. 11:20-24; 12:1-6 (Leahigh Testimony)	Lacks foundation, relies on facts not in evidence; also runs afoul of the secondary evidence rule (Evidence Code § 1523).	
26 27	DWR 61, at p. 11:25-28 (footnote 10) (Leahigh Testimony)	Evidence Code § 1523 (secondary evidence rule). The witness's characterization of WR 2010-0002 is misleadingly incomplete and inaccurate – the best evidence of what WR 2010-0002 actually says is WR 2010-0002 itself.	
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1	EXHIBIT	OBJECTION
2 3	DWR-66 (Nader-Tehrani Testimony)	Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions in the guise of expert testimony (Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69 Cal. App. 4th
4		1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material. Further this testimony's analysis of durations of time series
5		data for DSM2 modeling (4:4-9) is not peer-reviewed. Input data for DSM2 derives from CalSim II output and, therefore, lacks foundation and based on facts not in
6 7		evidence or which are speculative in nature. Insofar as this testimony relies on CalSim II modeling, it should be excluded under <i>Kellyl Frye</i> .
8	DWR-66, at pp. 2:10-11, 4:23-7:21, 8:7-11:18 (Nader-	Lacks foundation and based on facts not in evidence or which are speculative in nature. The proffered opinion
10	Tehrani Testimony)	testimony is based on inadequate, unreliable, or speculative underlying factual assumptions, data and modeling. This evidence fails to satisfy the Notice of Petition's requirement
11		that evidence "clearly identify and explain the logic, assumptions, development, and operation of the studies or models" relied upon. Insofar as this testimony relies on
12		CalSim II modeling, it should also be excluded under the <i>Kelly/Frye</i> rule.
13 14	DWR 71, at pp. 2:19-23, 9:2-17, 15:5-24, 16:18-18:5; 19:25-21:4 (Munevar Testimony)	Lacks foundation and based on facts not in evidence or which are speculative in nature. The proffered opinion
15	(Withieval Testimony)	testimony is based on inadequate, unreliable, or speculative underlying factual assumptions, data and modeling. This evidence fails to satisfy the Notice of Petition's requirement
16 17		that evidence "clearly identify and explain the logic, assumptions, development, and operation of the studies or models" relied upon. Insofar as this testimony relies on
18		CalSim II modeling, it should also be excluded under the <i>Kellyl Frye</i> rule.
19	DWR 71, at pp. 2:19-23, 12:15-18, 12:27-13:20, 15:5-24, 16:12-21, 17:7-14, 10:10-24, 10:25-21, 4	Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions in the guise of expert testimony
20	17:7-14, 19:10-24, 19:25-21:4 (Munevar Testimony)	(Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material.
21 22		
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EXHIBIT	OBJECTION
DWR-114	A. Lacks foundation and based on facts not in evidence or which are speculative in nature. The proffered opinion testimony is based on inadequate, unreliable, or speculative underlying factual assumptions, data and modeling. This evidence fails to satisfy the Notice of Petition's requirement that evidence "clearly identify and explain the logic, assumptions, development, and operation of the studies or models" relied upon. Insofar as this testimony relies on CalSim II modeling, it should also be excluded under the <i>Kelly/Frye</i> rule.
	B. Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions in the guise of expert testimony (<i>Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co.</i> (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material.
DWR-115	Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions in the guise of expert testimony (Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69 Cal. App. 4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material.
DWR-116	A. Lacks foundation and based on facts not in evidence or which are speculative in nature. The proffered opinion testimony is based on inadequate, unreliable, or speculative underlying factual assumptions, data and modeling. This evidence fails to satisfy the Notice of Petition's requirement that evidence "clearly identify and explain the logic, assumptions, development, and operation of the studies or models" relied upon. Insofar as this testimony relies on CalSim II modeling, it should also be excluded under the <i>Kellyl Frye</i> rule.
DWR-117	Lacks foundation and based on facts not in evidence and which are speculative in nature. The Draft Adaptive Management Plan is based on inadequate, unreliable, and speculative underlying factual assumptions about potential future decision-making by agencies and individuals, some of which are not the Petitioners and will not be acting under the control by Petitioners. This evidence fails to satisfy the Notice of Petition's requirement that evidence "clearly identify and explain the logic, assumptions, development, and operation of the studies or models" relied upon.
DWR-324	Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions in the guise of expert testimony (<i>Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co.</i> (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material.

1	EXHIBIT	OBJECTION
2 3 4 5	DWR-513	A. Lacks foundation and based on facts not in evidence or which are speculative in nature. The proffered opinion testimony is based on inadequate, unreliable, or speculative underlying factual assumptions, data and modeling. This evidence fails to satisfy the Notice of Petition's requirement that evidence "clearly identify and explain the logic, assumptions, development, and operation of the studies or models" relied upon. Insofar as this testimony relies on
6 7		CalSim II modeling, it should also be excluded under the <i>Kellyl Frye</i> rule.
8		B. Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions (<i>Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co.</i> in the guise of expert testimony (1999) 69
9		Cal.App.4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material.
11 12	DWR-514	A. Lacks foundation and based on facts not in evidence or which are speculative in nature. The proffered opinion testimony is based on inadequate, unreliable, or speculative underlying factual assumptions, data and modeling. This
13		evidence fails to satisfy the Notice of Petition's requirement that evidence "clearly identify and explain the logic, assumptions, development, and operation of the studies or
14 15		models" relied upon. Insofar as this testimony relies on CalSim II modeling, it should also be excluded under the <i>Kelly</i> / <i>Frye</i> rule.
16 17 18		B. Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions (<i>Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co.</i> in the guise of expert testimony (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material.
19	DWR-515	A. Lacks foundation and based on facts not in evidence or
20		which are speculative in nature. The proffered opinion testimony is based on inadequate, unreliable, or speculative underlying factual assumptions, data and modeling. This evidence fails to satisfy the Notice of Petition's requirement
21		that evidence "clearly identify and explain the logic, assumptions, development, and operation of the studies or
23		models" relied upon. Insofar as this testimony relies on CalSim II modeling, it should also be excluded under the <i>Kellyl Frye</i> rule.
24 25		B. Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions in the guise of expert testimony (Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69
26		Cal.App.4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material.
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1	EXHIBIT	OBJECTION
2 3 4	DOI-4, at pp. 2, 6 (joining in the improper testimony of Ms. Sergent); pp. 7-9 (testimony re documents separately included as DOI-13 through DOI-31) (Sahlberg	Evidence Code § 1523 (secondary evidence rule); DWR has possession or control of the referenced writings, which are the best and most reliable evidence of their content; a responsible trier of fact would not rely on secondary evidence of their content under these circumstances.
5	Testimony)	evidence of their content under these en cumstances.
6	DOI-4, at pp. 6-7, 9 (Sahlberg Testimony)	A. Lacks foundation and based on facts not in evidence or which are speculative in nature. The proffered opinion testimony is based on inadequate, unreliable, or speculative underlying factual assumptions, data and modeling. This
8		evidence fails to satisfy the Notice of Petition's requirement that evidence "clearly identify and explain the logic, assumptions, development, and operation of the studies or
9		models" relied upon. Insofar as this testimony relies on
10		CalSim II modeling, it should also be excluded under the Kellyl Frye rule.
11 12		B. Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions (Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co. in the guise of expert testimony (1999) 69
13		Cal.App.4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material.
14	DOI-5, at pp. 14, 17, 18 (Sahlberg Power Point)	A. Lacks foundation and based on facts not in evidence or which are speculative in nature. The proffered opinion
15 16		testimony is based on inadequate, unreliable, or speculative underlying factual assumptions, data and modeling. This evidence fails to satisfy the Notice of Petition's requirement
17		that evidence "clearly identify and explain the logic, assumptions, development, and operation of the studies or models" relied upon. Insofar as this testimony relies on
18		CalSim II modeling, it should also be excluded under the <i>Kellyl Frye</i> rule.
19		B. Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony
20 21		because it includes legal conclusions in the guise of expert testimony (Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69 Cal. App. 4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant
		material.
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EXHIBIT	OBJECTION	
DOI-7, at p. 4 (Milligan)	A. Lacks foundation and based on facts not in evidence or which are speculative in nature. The proffered opinion testimony is based on inadequate, unreliable, or speculative underlying factual assumptions, data and modeling. This evidence fails to satisfy the Notice of Petition's requirement that evidence "clearly identify and explain the logic, assumptions, development, and operation of the studies or models" relied upon. Insofar as this testimony relies on CalSim II modeling, it should also be excluded under the <i>Kellyl Frye</i> rule.	
	B. Improper and inadmissible expert opinion testimony because it includes legal conclusions in the guise of expert testimony (<i>Summers v. A. L. Gilbert Co.</i> (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1183), speculation, and/or irrelevant material.	

V. JOINDER IN OTHER PROTESTANTS' WRITTEN OBJECTIONS

In order to reduce repetition of arguments in this complex proceeding, Protestants County of San Joaquin, San Joaquin County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, and Mokelumne River Water and Power Authority hereby join in, adopt, and incorporate by this reference the motions to disqualify Petitioners' witnesses, motions to exclude Petitioners' witnesses' testimony, in whole or in part, and objections to Petitioners' witnesses' written testimony and exhibits, submitted by the following Protestants and groups of Protestants:

Central Delta Water Agency and South Delta Water Agency;

Sacramento Valley Water Users;

Save the California Delta Alliance;

California Sportfishing Protection Alliance (CSPA), California Water Impact Network (C-WIN), and AquaAlliance;

Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations and Institute for Fisheries Resources;

Friends of the River, Sierra Club California, Environmental Water Caucus, and Planning and Conservation League

Local Agencies of the North Delta, Bogle Vineyards/Delta Watershed Landowner Coalition, Diablo Vineyards and Brad Lange/DWLC, Stillwater Orchards, Friends of Stone Lakes National Wildlife Refuge and Islands Inc.;

San Joaquin Tributaries Authority; and

STATEMENT OF SERVICE

CALIFORNIA WATERFIX PETITION HEARING Department of Water Resources and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Petitioners)

I hereby certify that I have this day submitted to the State Water Resources Control Board and caused a true and correct copy of the following document(s):

Objections of the County of San Joaquin, San Joaquin County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, and Mokelumne River Water and Power Authority to Written Testimony and Exhibits Submitted by Petitioners; Joinder in Written Objections Submitted by Other Protestants

to be served **by Electronic Mail** (email) upon the parties listed in Table 1 of the **Current Service List** for the California WaterFix Petition Hearing, dated July 11, 2016, posted by the State Water Resources Control Board at

http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/bay_delta/california_waterfix/service_list.shtml

I certify that the foregoing is true and correct and that this document was executed on July 12, 2016.

Signature:

Name: Tonia Robancho

Title: Legal Assistant for Thomas H. Keeling

Freeman Firm

Party/Affiliation:

County of San Joaquin, San Joaquin County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, and Mokelumne River Water and Power Authority

Jonia Robandro

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Restore the Delta.

VI. **CONCLUSION**

This Hearing on Petitioners' Petition for Change in the Point of Diversion is premature and should not proceed until the issuance and appropriate vetting of the final EIR/EIS, and until the State Board has completed its review and update of the Bay-Delta Water Quality Control Plan. As presently structured, this proceeding unfairly and unlawfully shifts the burden of proof and persuasion with respect to "no injury" from the Petitioners to the Protestants; unless and until Petitioners carry their heavy burden of proof and persuasion, Protestants should be under no obligation whatsoever to make an affirmative showing of "injury" to legal users of water. For all these reasons, and based upon the procedural objections of other Protestants incorporated herein by reference, this Hearing should not proceed at this time.

Moreover, Petitioners' evidence, including the above-referenced written witness testimony and exhibits, lacks foundation, impermissibly relies on facts and assumptions not in evidence, relies on unreliable hearsay and other improper evidence, runs afoul of the Kelly/Frye rule, and/or exceeds the permissible scope of witness testimony. For all these reasons, and for the reasons stated by other Protestants whose evidentiary objections are incorporated herein by reference, the Petitioners' evidence referenced herein should be excluded, in whole or in part. Alternatively, to the extent these objections go to the weight of the evidence rather than to admissibility, the San Joaquin County Protestants respectfully submit that such evidence should be disregarded or accorded only nominal weight.

Dated: July 12, 2016

FREEMAN FIRM

A Professional Law Corporation

Attorneys for Protestants County of San Joaquin, San Joaquin County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, and Mokelumne River Water and Power

Authority