1 2 3 4	JON D. RUBIN, State Bar No. VALERIE C. KINCAID, State DIEPENBROCK HARRISON A Professional Corporation 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1800 Sacramento, CA 95814-4413 Telephone: (916) 492-5000 Facsimile: (916) 446-4535	196944 Bar No. 231815			
5	Facsimile: (916) 446-4535				
6	Attorneys for California Ameri Water Company	can			
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CLOSING BRIEF

I. Introduction¹

Much of this case hinges on a single question: Should the State Water Resources Control Board ("Board") adhere to its prior order – Order 95-10.² California American Water Company ("CAW") believes it should and it must. Clearly, in Order 95-10, the Board adjudicated CAW's Carmel River water rights and found CAW had been extracting more water than permitted under those rights.³ That, however, is not the extent of the order. The Board did much more.

In Order 95-10, the Board considered the needs of the people on the Monterey Peninsula and the needs of public trust resources. The Board decided CAW could extract more water than it was permitted under the water rights it holds. In the words of the Board: "[t]he people and businesses on the Monterey Peninsula must continue to be served water from the Carmel River in order to protect public health and safety." (Order 95-10, p. 37.) As a result, the Board authorized CAW to extract up to 11,285 acre-feet of water from the Carmel River, at a minimum. And, in exchange for that authorization, the Board ordered CAW to diligently pursue alternative supplies, increase its effort to encourage conservation, and operate its facilities to mitigate for impacts on public trust resources.

CAW has respected the interim solution issued by the Board. It has continuously and aggressively sought alternative supplies. It has implemented conservation measures and changed its operations, as required. CAW's response has not come without cost. CAW has invested millions of dollars and tens of thousands of person hours. The community on the Monterey Peninsula has also responded. The community has achieved a level of conservation that far exceeds that achieved by most, if not all other communities in California. (Hearing Transcript, Phase 2 ("HT2"), p. 807:20-

¹ CAW requested an extension to the page limit for its closing brief, to ensure it was able to fully brief all matters. The Hearing Officers denied this request on September 23, 2008. Due to this denial, CAW was unable to fully brief all issues and objections. CAW hereby incorporates all prior objections as presented orally and reflected in prior pleadings. CAW hopes to use its reply brief to respond to issues raised by other participants, but not briefed herein.

^{24 | 2} The Hearing Officers admitted into evidence Order 95-10 as Exhibit SWRCB 2. CAW recognizes the Board amended Order 95-10 pursuant to the terms of a settlement and subsequent orders. (Order 98-04; Order 2002-02.) For ease of reference, CAW does not, in each reference, indicate that the order has been amended. Also, CAW does not refer to it by its exhibit number.

³ As reflected in the language of Order 95-10, CAW does not divert surface water from the Carmel River, but extracts subsurface Carmel River water. For this reason, CAW characterizes its diversion in this brief as extraction.

⁴ More specifically, Order 95-10 orders CAW to cease and desist extractions of Carmel River water in excess of 14,106 acre-feet. (Order 95-10, p. 40.) It also compels CAW to implement measures that have the goal of achieving 20 percent conservation. (*Id.*, pp. 40-41.) As a result, Order 95-10 is often cited loosely are establishing a 11,285 acre-foot extraction limit (80 percent of 14,106 acre-feet is approximately 11,285 acre-feet).

EPENBROCK 809:13.) The prosecution team presented no evidence to the contrary.

Instead, the prosecution team and others support their position by asking the Board to ignore most of the history described above. In a very candid statement, the prosecution team explained: "95-10 is very important and also irrelevant." (Hearing Transcript, Phase 1 ("HT1"), p. 16:25-17:1.) The prosecution team and others consider Order 95-10's limitation of CAW's water rights important, but quickly dismiss the remainder of the order. They want the Board to issue a cease and desist order based solely on CAW's extraction of more water than permitted under its water rights.

The position of the prosecution team and others ignores extensive evidence. It assumes the Board, in Order 95-10, did not allow CAW to extract more water than otherwise available under its water rights, did not compel CAW to mitigate its effects on public trust resources, did not compel CAW to "diligently pursue" alternative water supplies, and did not compel CAW to increase its efforts to encourage conservation. The prosecution team and others do not provide support for these assumptions or explain why the Board should undermine the delicate balance struck in Order 95-10. Their position inexplicably runs counter to well-established legal principles, as well as the overwhelming evidence in the record.

Incredibly, the position of the prosecution team and others is plagued with deficiencies beyond their fundamental attempt to undermine and have the Board unlawfully interpret Order 95-10. The prosecution team and others ask the Board to issue a cease and desist order without providing sufficient evidence to support the requested remedy. They do not provide evidence the proposed remedy will protect trust resources or health and safety. In fact, evidence presented at the hearing reveals the prosecution team and others promote issuance of a cease and desist order to maintain a single punitive focus; reducing CAW's extractions of water from the Carmel River. That, however, was the focus of the hearing that resulted in Order 95-10 and therefore Order 95-10 controls the issue.

During the hearing, the prosecution team and others alleged the remedy they propose – step reductions in CAW's extractions – will protect public trust resources. However, they did not identify any relationship between the proposed remedy and benefits to public trust resources. Indeed, the record contains no evidence that the proposed changes in CAW extractions (again subsurface) will increase the amount of surface water in the Carmel River. Nor is there evidence the proposed

changes in CAW extractions will improve public trust resources, including the population of steelhead. The overwhelming evidence demonstrates trust resources in the Carmel River watershed, although clearly not at the recovery point, have improved significantly, particularly since the issuance of Order 95-10.

The prosecution team and others also fail to provide evidence to support a finding that the proposed remedy will protect public health or safety. The prosecution team alleged the proposed further step reductions in CAW's extractions would maintain quantities of water available for beneficial use on the Monterey Peninsula. On this point, the prosecution team relied upon the opinion of an engineer, who, although a dedicated public servant, has no municipal experience and no experience operating water utilities. Upon cross examination, it became clear that reliance was misplaced. The uninformed opinion of the prosecution team's witness was juxtaposed against the expert opinions of the elected officials of the municipalities on the Monterey Peninsula and the opinion of the Director of Engineering for CAW – each of whom warned the Board the remedy proposed by the prosecution team and others would jeopardize the public. The opinion of the prosecution team's witness also conflicts with the Board's prior finding that maintaining CAW's extractions at existing levels is necessary "to protect public health and safety." (Order 95-10, p. 37.)

II. Background

See CAW Pre-Hearing Brief on Procedural Matter, Section II (Background), filed with the Board on April 9, 2008, which CAW hereby incorporates herein by reference. (A copy of Section II is attached as Attachment 1.)

III. Burden Of Proof And Standard Of Proof

In an enforcement-related administrative proceeding, the burden of proof, including the burden to affirmatively demonstrate the appropriateness of a particular remedy, is on the prosecution team. (*Parker v. City of Fountain Valley* (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 99, 113.) The Board has specifically acknowledged this principle in relation to its enforcement proceedings. (*See* Board Order WQC 84-5.) Because administrative proceedings are civil in nature, the prosecution team's claims must be proven by a preponderance of evidence, just as a court would apply in a civil action. (*See People v. Garcia* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1070, 1078; Board Order WR 87-2.)

IV. Neither The Prosecution Team Nor Any Other Entity Participating In This Proceeding Presented Legal Argument Or Evidence To Support The Issuance Of A Cease And Desist Order

In this case, the Board may only impose a cease and desist order against CAW, if the Board finds CAW has violated or is threatening to violate condition 2 of Order 95-10, a condition that requires CAW to diligently pursue new water supplies. In this proceeding, no entity presented evidence to support the issuance of a cease and desist order. The evidence before the Board reflects the fact that CAW has and continues to aggressively pursue additional water supplies.

A. The Board, Based On The Case Brought By The Prosecution Team, Identified A Narrow Scope For The Liability Phase Of This Hearing

The prosecution team asserts CAW should be subject to a cease and desist order. The legal bases for the draft cease and desist order proposed by the prosecution team are: (1) an alleged violation of condition 2 of Order 95-10, and (2) an alleged trespass by CAW.⁵

B. The Board Can Issue A Cease And Desist Order Against CAW Only If The Board Finds CAW Is Threatening To Violate Or Has Violated Condition 2 Of Order 95-10

The prosecution team and others contend, albeit without any evidence or legal support, that CAW can trespass upon the waters of the State even if CAW complies with condition 2 of Order 95-10. (Prosecution Team Pre-hearing Brief, p. 1.) They believe the Board can act without regard to its standing order and issue a cease and desist order against CAW, based on Water Code section 1052 and a finding of trespass. CAW does not dispute the Board's general authority to address a water-right related trespass using a cease and desist order. Clearly, under section 1052, water use can amount to a trespass if it is not "authorized." (Water Code, § 1052.) However, in the current circumstance, CAW's compliance with Order 95-10 insulates it from a cease and desist order. Order 95-10 provides CAW with authority to extract Carmel River water in excess of its water rights. Thus, notwithstanding the prosecution team's allegation, only if CAW has violated Order 95-10, and in this case condition 2, can the Board issue a cease and desist order.

1. Order 95-10 Is An Interim Physical Solution That Authorizes CAW To Extract Water In Excess Of That Permitted Under Its Water Rights

Order 95-10 is a unique, interim physical solution, which provides CAW with a non-

⁵ See Exhibit SWRCB 7 and the March 13, 2008, March 29, 2008 and May 29, 2008 rulings.

traditional authorization to extract water in excess of its water rights. "A 'physical solution' involves the application of general equitable principles to achieve practical allocation of water to competing interests so that a reasonable accommodation of demands upon a water source can be achieved." The Board, through Order 95-10, struck precisely this type of balance; implementing a practical allocation of water based on competing interests. (Order 95-10, pp. 38-44.)

In Order 95-10, the Board, in unambiguous terms, found:

- 1. Prior to 1995, CAW had been extracting, on average, 14,106 acre-feet of water from the Carmel River, (id., p. 14.);
- 2. At the time, the water rights held by CAW entitled it to extract up to 3,376 acre-feet of water from the Carmel River, (*id.*, pp. 17-25); and
- 3. CAW could not significantly reduce its diversions of Carmel River Water; "[t]he people and businesses on the Monterey Peninsula must continue to be served water from the Carmel River in order to protect public health and safety." (*Id.*, p. 37.)

Based on those findings, the Board recognized it could "request the Attorney General to take action under Section 1052 [of the Water Code]." (*Id.*, p. 39.) It also recognized it had an alternative course available. It could "suspend a referral provided that Cal-Am takes appropriate actions to: mitigate the effect of its diversions on the environment and develop and diligently pursue a plan for obtaining water from the Carmel River or other source consistent with California water law." (*Id.*, p. 39.) The Board took the alternative path.

In condition 2 of Order 95-10, the Board ordered CAW to "diligently implement one or more of the following actions to terminate its unlawful diversion from the Carmel River: (1) obtain appropriative permits. . .; (2) obtain water from other sources of supply. . . and/or (3) contract with another agency. . . ." (*Id.*, p. 40.) As CAW diligently pursued alternative water supplies, the Board required CAW to "forthwith cease and desist from diverting any water in excess of 14,106 [acre-feet per annum] from the Carmel River, until unlawful extractions from the Carmel River are ended." (*Id.*, p. 39 (emphasis added).) It imposed a requirement that CAW implement conservation measures, which, in combination with then-existing measures, would have a goal of achieving 15 percent

⁶ Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Wat. Res. Control Bd. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 548, 572 (citing Hutchins, the California Law of Water Rights (1956) 351-354.) See also Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail (1938) 11 Cal.2d 501, 560-561 (supporting the application of a physical solution to resolve dispute involving users of surface water).

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conservation in the 1996 water year and 20 percent conservation in each subsequent year. The also imposed measures to mitigate CAW diversions from the Carmel River, generally, and from upper reaches of the Carmel River, specifically, (Id., p. 40.)

The Board made clear CAW could be subject to an enforcement action based on a trespass claim if it violated a condition in Order 95-10. The Board wrote: "The Chief, Division of Water Rights, is authorized to refer any violation of these conditions to the Attorney General for actions under Section 1052 or to initiate such other enforcement actions as may be appropriate under the Water Code." (Id., p. 45.) The plain language of Order 95-10 clearly reflects the intent of the Board to impose an interim physical solution that allows CAW to continue to extract in excess of its water rights while it pursues a new water source, provided CAW complies with those other terms and conditions imposed on it. (Id., pp. 40-44.) It makes equally clear in the annunciation of enforcement options CAW would be subject to enforcement action only if it violates Order 95-10.

> During The 13 Years Since The Board Issued Order 95-10, The Board Has Consistently Interpreted Order 95-10 As Authorizing CAW To Extract Water In Excess Of That Allowed Under Its Water Rights

Throughout the 13 years since it issued Order 95-10, the Board knew CAW has been extracting Carmel River water in excess of the amount allowed under its water rights and consistently sanctioned such excessive extractions. The prosecution team concedes the point.

The Board has been aware CAW extracts more water than allowed under its water rights. The Board received approximately 50 quarterly reports from CAW since 1995. In each of those reports, CAW reported the actions it had been and/or planned to take to continue its compliance with Order 95-10. (Ex. CAW 30B-30WW.) The Board responded in writing to the CAW quarterly reports. Those Board responses reflect its consistent recognition that CAW was extracting more water than allowed under its water rights, and that such diversions were consistent with Order 95-10.9

⁷ Order 95-10, p. 39. As explained in footnote 4 above, because of the requirement to impose measures that have a goal of achieving a 20 percent reduction, people often reference an 11,285 acre-feet limit established by Order 95-10 (14,106 x 80% = 11.285).

⁸ It is this authorization which prohibits enforcement under trespass; trespass is defined by Water Code section 1052 as unauthorized use of water. (Water Code, § 1052.)

⁹ Ex. SWRCB 8-2(d), p. 1 ("Cal-Am provided records to document that it produced a total of 10,025 afa for the 1994-1995 water year . . . The available data indicates that Cal-Am operated within the production cap specified in Order 95-10."); Ex. SWRCB 8-2(f), p. 2 ("Condition 3(b) limits the quantity of water which Cal-Am can pump from the Carmel River system to 11,990 acre-feet (af) during the 1996 water year and 11,285 af during subsequent water years."); Ex. SWRCB 8-2(g), p. 1 ("Order 95-10 sets the 1996-97 water year diversion limitation at 11,285 af."); Ex. SWRCB 8-2(h),

In addition to the citations in footnote 8 above, CAW highlights two examples. In 2002, James Kassel, acting on behalf of the Board, wrote: "The report states that Cal-Am complied with the diversion limits of Order 95-10. The Division concurs that Cal-Am complied with the 11,285 acre-feet (af) diversion limit." (Ex. SWRCB 8-2(s).)¹⁰ Similarly, Kathy Mrowka, approximately ten years earlier, communicated on behalf of the Board, stating: "Condition 3(b) limits the quantity of water which Cal-Am can pump from the Carmel River system to 11,990 acre-feet (af) during the 1996 water year and 11,285 af during subsequent water years." (Ex. SWRCB 8-2(f), p. 2.) Through the testimony of its witnesses, not surprisingly since they included Ms. Mrowka, the prosecution team acknowledges the Board authorized CAW to extract in excess of water rights.¹¹

3. The Law Bars A Finding By The Board That CAW Has Committed A Trespass If It Complies With Order 95-10

Well established legal principles prelude the Board from issuing a cease and desist order against CAW when CAW is complying with Order 95-10. Collateral estoppel and res judicata "rest upon the sound policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair adversary hearing on an issue from again drawing it into controversy and subjecting the other party to further expense in its reexamination." (Cal. Jurisprudence 3rd, Judgments, § 150.) They are "intended to preserve the integrity of the judicial system and promote judicial economy." (Id.) In this circumstance, and for the precise reason they exist, those doctrines preclude the Board from subjecting CAW to a cease and desist order, so long as CAW is in compliance with Order 95-10.

p. 2 ("In the quarterly submittal, Cal-Am established diversion goals for the Carmel River wells, and identified the quantity of water that can be pumped monthly in order to meet the 11,285 afa goal established in Order 95-10."); Ex. SWRCB 8-2(i), p. 1 ("Cal-Am documented that it has complied with the 11,285 acre-feet (af) per annum water conservation goal in Order 95-10."); Ex. SWRCB 8-2(l), p. 1 ("The California-American Water Company extracted a total of 10,739 acre-feet (af) from the Carmel River, or 4.8 percent less than the 11,285 af goal established in Order 95-10."); Ex. SWRCB 8-2(p) ("The submittal documents that the California-American Water Company has complied with the requirements of Order 95-10 for the 2004-2005 water year, including the 11,285 acre-feet annual diversion limit."); Ex. SWRCB 8-2(s) ("The report states that Cal-Am complied with the diversion limits of Order 95-10. The Division concurs that Cal-Am complied with the 11,285 acre-feet (af) diversion limit.")

¹⁰ Exhibit SWRCB 8-2 is a single exhibit that includes 24 Board responses to CAW quarterly reports. Attachment 2 is a table CAW prepared that identifies each Board response and designates each with letter – (a) through (x). Thus, for purposes of clarity, when citing to a specific response, CAW has references the exhibit as well as the assigned letter, as reflected in Attachment 2.

HT1, p. 47:14-16 (Ms. Mrowka: "Order 95-10 describes the water conservation goal of 11,285 acre-feet per annum, and that is the operating limit at this time."), 100:15-25; HT2, 179:22-180:2 (Mr. Rubin: "Though you would agree the State Water Resources Control Board contemplated that for some period after the issuance of Order 95-10 California American Water would continue to extract more than 3,376 acre-feet of water from the Carmel River?" Mr. Stretars: "Yes, I agree to that."), 190:22-25 (Mr. Rubin: "Under Order 95-10, California American Water has a Carmel River extraction limit of 11,285, is that correct?" Mr. Stretars: "Yes".)

Collateral estoppel precludes a party from re-litigating issues in a second proceeding that were litigated and determined in a prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341 ("Lucido").) Collateral estoppel will bar an issue from being re-litigated if: (1) the issue decided in a prior proceeding is identical to the current issue, (2) the issue was actually litigated, (3) the issue was necessarily decided in the prior litigation, (4) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits, and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted is the same as, or in privity with, a party to the prior proceeding. (Ex. CAW-015, p.11 [quoting Lucido, 51 Cal.3d at p. 341].) Similarly, res judicata "operates as a bar to the maintenance of a second suit between the same parties on the same cause of action." (Clark v. Lesher (1956) 46 Cal.2d 874, 880.) Res judicata applies if: (1) a claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim or issue raised in a prior proceeding, (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits, and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 253.)

Collateral estoppel and res judicata apply to claims and issues that the prosecution team and others present in this proceeding. Administrative agencies, including the Board, recognize these doctrines. (Ex. CAW-015, p.13 [quoting *People v. Sims* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 479 (superseded on another grounds)]; *Williams v. City of Oakland* (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 64, 68.)

The Board issued Order 95-10, based on complaints filed by a number of entities, including the Sierra Club and the Carmel River Steelhead Association. (Exs. CAW 01-04.) The complaints alleged CAW was extracting water from the Carmel River without authorization, and the alleged unauthorized extractions were adversely affecting public trust resources. (Exs. CAW-04, CAW-01.) Pursuant to those claims, in 1992, the Board began a multi-year evaluation of CAW's Carmel River water extractions, which culminated in a comprehensive adjudicatory hearing. (Order 95-10, p. 14.) In response to the complaints and as a result of the hearing, the Board reviewed thousands of pages of technical data and heard countless hours of testimony. (*Id.*, pp. 11-12, 21-22.) The Board considered the extent of CAW's Carmel River water rights, and the impacts of CAW's extractions, within and outside of its water rights, on instream beneficial uses including: vegetative resources (*id.*, pp. 25-26), wildlife resources, (*id.*, pp. 26-27), fishery resources, (*id.*, p. 27); and steelhead resources in

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As a result of this exhaustive review, the Board issued Order 95-10. Order 95-10 defined CAW's water rights and identified the effects of CAW's continued extractions in excess of its water rights on other beneficial uses of Carmel River water, including public trust resources. (*Id.*, pp. 39-40.) The claims and issues addressed in Order 95-10 were necessarily decided. Order 95-10 represents the Board's determination on all pled issues and all evidence presented. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 768.) The participants in the hearing had the opportunity to challenge the manner in which the Board addressed the claims and issues. In fact, the Sierra Club and the Carmel River Steelhead Association took advantage of that opportunity and filed a petition for writ of mandate with the Superior Court of California, County of Monterey. (Ex. CAW-016.)

In their second amended petition for writ of mandate, petitioners Sierra Club and Carmel River Steelhead Association explained:

The complaints alleged that Cal-Am: 1) does not have the legal right to divert water from wells in Carmel Valley; diversions are adversely affecting the public trust resources with the Carmel River; and 2) diversions from San Clemente Dam are not a reasonable method of diversion. In Order No. WR 95-10, the State of California Water Resources Control Board ("Board") determined that Cal-Am: 1) does not have legal right for about 10,730 acre-feet (af) annually which it currently diverts from the Carmel River, and 2) diversions are having an adverse affect on the public trust resources of the Carmel River. The Board imposed certain requirements on Cal-Am that petitioners believe are inadequate to protect instream uses and public trust resources of the Carmel River.

(*Id.*, p. 2:10-18.) All of the parties to that action, including the petitioners noted above and the Board agreed to dismiss the action with prejudice. (Ex. CAW-017.) Thus, while some might not like the outcome and have second thoughts on their decision to dismiss the case with prejudice, it should be beyond reasonable dispute that, in Order 95-10, the Board addressed the allegations raised and made determination thereon. The Board cannot reconsider them now.¹²

In sum, the claims and issues related to CAW's use of Carmel River water were previously and actually adjudicated. Order 95-10 was the result of extensive briefing and a formal hearing before the Board. It reflects a decision by the Board on the claims and issues raised by the parties

¹² Interestingly, even if the Board believed it could reconsider claims or issues previously presented to it, subject matter jurisdiction to address complaints with Order 95-10 now rests with the California Superior Court. (Ex. CAW 17, ¶8.)

and participants thereto. It was made only after consideration of all presented evidence. Order 95-10 2 5 6 7

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represents the Board's final judgment on the merits. If there were any debate as to the effect of Order 95-10, the debate should have ended when all parties agreed to dismiss their challenges to Order 95-10 with prejudice. Accordingly, the Board cannot issue a cease and desist order simply because CAW extracts more water than permitted under its water rights. This issue has previously been reviewed at length in a formal hearing, adjudicated, determined on the merits, appealed and settled. Therefore, review based on CAW extractions in excess of its water rights would amount to an unlawful reopening of the very claims and issues settled by Order 95-10. The Board has not and should not accept an attack of a prior order through an enforcement action. 13

The Board Does Not Have Sufficient Evidence To Support A Finding That CAW C. Has Violated Condition 2 Of Order 95-10

Notwithstanding the two issues identified by the prosecution team, for the reasons explained above, liability in this proceeding must hinge on whether CAW is in compliance with condition 2 of Order 95-10. There is apparent disagreement over the intent of Order 95-10's condition 2. CAW believes condition 2 requires CAW to aggressively seek water supplies, a requirement that CAW has met. The prosecution team and others interpret condition 2 very differently; they believe condition 2 orders CAW to terminate all extractions from the Camel River in excess of CAW's water rights. The prosecution team and others allege CAW is violating condition 2 because CAW extracts more water than allowed under its water rights. Legal principles of interpretation and the evidence presented during this proceeding require the Board to accept CAW's position.

Condition 2 Of Order 95-10 Requires CAW To Maintain A Consistent Effort To Acquire Alternative Supplies

When interpreting prior orders, the Board should employ traditional principles of interpretation. If the words of the order are unambiguous, the Board need not delve deeper. (Board Order No. 87-08, p. 13; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 837, 842-43

¹³ Board Order No. WR 2007-0027-EXEC, p. 11 (attempting to revisit an order through a later enforcement action constitutes an "improper collateral attack"); North Gualala Water Co. v. State Wat. Res. Control Bd. (2006) 139 Cal. App.4th 1577, 1607 (concluding that a water right permittee cannot accept permit conditions and then wait two years to challenge the premise on which they were based); See also, Water Code §§ 1126(b), 1122; Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510-511.

1	("Chevron").) It should give the words their usual and ordinary meaning. Only in the event the				
2	words create ambiguity should the Board look beyond the order. (Chevron, p. 842-43; Board Order				
3	No. 91-03, p. 17.)				
4	a. Condition 2 Clearly And Unambiguously Requires CAW To				
5	Maintain A Consistent Effort To Acquire Alternative Water Supplies				
6	The Board should accord the words in condition 2 of Order 95-10 their plain meaning. When				
7	that is done, condition 2 is clear and unambiguous. Condition 2 states:				
8	Cal-Am shall diligently implement one or more of the following actions to terminate				
9	its unlawful diversions from the Carmel River: (1) obtain appropriative permits for water being unlawfully diverted from the Carmel River, (2) obtain water from other sources of supply and make one-for-one reductions in unlawful diversions from the				
10	Carmel River, provided that water pumped from the Seaside aquifer shall be governed by condition 4 of this Order not this condition, and/or (3) contract with another agency				
	having appropriative rights to divert and use water from the Carmel River.				
12	(Order 95-10, p. 40 (emphasis added).) Webster's Law Dictionary defines "diligent" as "constant in				
13	effort" and "implement" as "put into effect according to or by means of a definite plan or procedure." (Webster's Encyclopedia Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (1996).) Based on those				
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16	plain meanings, condition 2, must be interpreted to compel CAW to maintain a consistent effort, the				
17	purpose of which is to obtain alternative water supplies. The effort can be accomplished through the				
18	three actions identified in condition 2.				
19	b. The Record And Prior Rulings By The Board Support An Interpretation Of Condition 2, Which Requires CAW Maintain A Consistent Effort To Acquire Alternative Water Supplies				
20	Assuming, <i>arguendo</i> , the Board found the language of condition 2 ambiguous and needed to				
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22	look beyond the plain meaning of the language, the non-operative sections of Order 95-10 and the				
23	evidence in the record support an interpretation of condition 2 which requires CAW make a				
24	consistent effort toward one or more actions identified therein, actions that are intended to result in				
25	the acquisition of new water supplies. Nothing suggests condition 2 was intended to simply order				
26	CAW to terminate extractions.				
27	The Board discusses condition 2's requirements in section 8.0 of Order 95-10. There, the				
28	Board wrote:				

[T]he SWRCB can suspend such a referral provided that Cal-Am takes appropriate actions to: (a) mitigate the effects of its diversions in the environment; and (b) <u>develop and diligently pursue a plan for obtaining water</u> from the Carmel River or other sources consistent with California Water law.

(Order 95-10, p. 37 (emphasis added).) The evidence and testimony presented in this proceeding reflects a similar interpretation.¹⁴ Further, the prosecution team witnesses testified on cross-examination that the prosecution team interprets condition 2 to require CAW to "diligently pursue" an alternate water source.¹⁵

If there were any remaining doubt, outside of this proceeding and unrelated to CAW, the Board long ago defined diligence consistent with the interpretation provided above. The Board wrote:

Diligence is defined to be the 'steady application to business of any kind, constant effort to accomplish any undertaking.' The law does not require any unusual or extraordinary effort, but only that which is usual, ordinary and reasonable. . . . It is the doing of an act, or series of acts with all practical expedition with no delay except such as may be incident to the work.

(Decision No. A 1149 D 430 (1938), p. 6.)

2. The Record Conclusively Demonstrates CAW Has And Will Continue To Comply with Condition 2

Condition 2 of Order 95-10 requires the diligent pursuit of alternate water supplies. No evidence has been presented that would support a finding that CAW lacks diligence in its pursuit of alternative water supplies. All of the evidence in the record proves just the opposite.¹⁶

Simultaneous to the issuance of Order 95-10, the Board issued permit 20808 to the Monterey Peninsula Water District ("MPWMD") for the New Los Padres Dam Project ("NLP Dam project"). CAW supported the NLP Dam project and, at the time, contemplated a contract with the MPWMD for a water supply. (Ex. CAW-029, p. 2:22-25; Ex. CAW-031, p. 1:20-25; Ex. CAW-032, pp. 1:28-

Ex. SWRCB 8-2 (a) ("Order 95-10 requires Cal-Am to diligently pursue a legal water supply."); PT-8, p. 2 ("The S[tate] W[ater] B[oard] has withheld enforcement action provided Cal-Am adhered to the terms of Order 95-10 and was diligently pursuing water rights for its diversions.")

¹⁵ HT1, p. 136:9-14 (Mr. Rubin: "The State Board explained condition 2 in Order 95-10 as a requirement that California American Water develops and diligently pursues a plan for obtaining water from the Carmel River or from other sources consistent with California water law; is that correct?" Ms. Mrowka: "Yes."), 138:12-17 (Mr. Rubin: "Are you aware that the Division of Water Rights has also expressed the position that in order to comply with Condition 2 of Order 95-10 California American Water is to diligently pursue a legal water supply?" Mrs. Mrowka: "Yes.")

¹⁶ For complete description of all actions undertaken by CAW, see Exhibit CAW-029 through CAW-032.

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27 28 2:7.) However, the NLP Dam project was defeated by voters, and, immediately thereafter, CAW began pursuing its own dam project, the Carmel River Dam and Reservoir project ("CR Dam project"). (Ex. CAW-029, p. 2:23-28; Ex. CAW-031, p. 1:23-28; Ex. CAW-032, p. 2:5-8; HT1, pp. 270:3-271:3.)

From 1995 to 2003, CAW invested significant resources pursuing the CR Dam project.¹⁷ CAW worked in conjunction with MPWMD to transfer water permits from the NLP Dam project to the CR Dam project. In addition, CAW submitted a separate application for appropriative rights to 36,130 acre-feet of Carmel River water (Application No. 30644), which remains pending. (Ex. MPWMD 1, p. 13.) CAW completed a full environmental impact report, conducted community outreach, and otherwise fully funded the CR Dam project effort. (See fn. 15 and fn. 16.)

In 1998, the California Legislature, through Assembly Bill 1182 and the California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") required a change in the focus of CAW's effort. They demanded a comprehensive investigation of alternatives to the CR Dam project. (Ex. CAW-029, p. 2:23-28; Ex. CAW-030, p. 2:15-18; Ex. CAW-032, pp. 2:26-3:2.) This comprehensive consideration of alternatives became known as Plan B. The Plan B process includes the evaluation of numerous water supply options. (Ex. CAW-032, pp. 3:3-5:18.) During this time, CAW again applied for appropriative rights to the Carmel River, submitting Application Nos. 30715 and 30215 for appropriation of Carmel River water.

In 2002, the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") officially opposed the CR Dam project and MPWMD requested CAW withdraw its application for the CR Dam project. (Ex. CAW 32, pp. 4:12-16, 5:3-5.) And, in 2003, the CR Dam project was officially rejected by the MPWMD. (Ex. CAW-029, p. 3:11; Ex. CAW-032, pp. 4:25-5:1.) As a result, the Coastal Water Project ("CWP") emerged from the Plan B process as the preferred course of action to obtain long-term alternative water supplies. (Ex. CAW-031, p. 2:8-9, Ex. CAW-032, p. 5:14-20.) CAW held extensive public outreach meetings during 2004 and 2005, to educate and receive feedback on the

¹⁷ Ex. CAW-029, pp. 2:26-28, 3:6-8; Ex. CAW-031, pp. 1:25-2:21 (costs incurred in pursuing CR Dam project); Ex. CAW-032, p. 2:7-25 (CAW crafted CR Dam project in an attempt to solve issues with NLP Dam project), 4:12-5:8 (CAW pursued CR Dam project despite opposition); HT1, p. 233:14-22 (From 1996 to 2003 CAW pursued development of the CR Dam project).

CWP from its customers. (Ex. CAW-030, pp. 2:25-3:24.) As the lead agency, the CPUC required CAW prepare a proponent's environmental assessment ("PEA"). (Ex. CAW-029, p. 3:13-14.) CAW immediately arranged for the preparation of the PEA. (Ex. CAW-032, p. 6:12-15; Ex. CAW-032B.)

The PEA was finalized and submitted to the CPUC in July 2005. (Ex. CAW-030, p. 4:3-4; Ex. CAW-032, p. 6:17-19.)

Immediately thereafter, CPUC began preparation of an environmental impact report; the CPUC expects to finalize the report in 2009. (Ex. CAW-029, p. 3:15-16; Ex. CAW-032, p. 6:22-23.) To date, CAW has invested over \$17 million implementing the CWP. (Ex. CAW-031, p. 2:22-3:9; CAW-031C.) Currently, CAW is funding the CPUC's environmental study and impact report, and is working with the CPUC to facilitate its completion. (Ex. CAW-029, p. 3:15-16; Ex. CAW-032, p. 6:22-23.)

In the meantime, CAW continues to do all it can to move Plan B forward. (Ex. CAW-030, p. 4:6-8; Ex. CAW-032, p. 6:20-25.) In 2006, CAW began biological surveys and environmental studies, usually performed after the completion of the environmental impact report, to facilitate the process. (Ex. CAW-030, pp. 5:25-6:17; Ex. CAW-032, p. 6:27-28; Ex. CAW-032C.) CAW has also obtained permits and constructed a pilot desalination plant, which has already begun initial testing. (Ex. CAW-030, pp. 6:18-7:11; Ex. CAW-032, p. 7:1-5.) Further, CAW continues its active public outreach efforts. (Ex. CAW-030, pp. 4:22-5:21.)

CAW worked with the MPWMD to obtain appropriative water rights for an aquifer storage and recharge project, phase 1 ("Phase 1 ASR"). (Ex. CAW-029, p. 3:17-24; Ex. CAW-030, pp. 1:24-2:12.) In 2007, the Board granted permit 20808A, jointly to CAW and MPWMD providing rights to extract and store up to 2,426 acre-feet per annum of Carmel River water. (Ex. CAW-030, p. 2:7-13.) CAW entered into an agreement with the City of Sand City to operate and manage a desalination plant, where a portion of the water produced therefrom will, for a period of time, be used to offset CAW's Carmel River extractions. (Ex. CAW-029, pp. 4:24-5:8.)

CAW amended Application 30215 in an effort to permit 2,900 acre-feet of Table 13 water. (Ex. CAW-029, pp. 3:25-4:12; HT1, pp. 404:21-405:4.)¹⁸

¹⁸ HT1, pp. 405:14-21 (CAW is currently pursuing the application), 458:13-22, 460:23-461:6 (as recommended by the

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Further, CAW considered various other actions, such as: 3 MGD and 7 MGD desalination plants, groundwater development projects, dredging San Clemente and Los Padres reservoirs, water purchases from outside of the Carmel River watershed, production from small weirs in the Carmel River, surface water impoundment, as well as contracting for appropriative water rights from the Marina Coast Water District and the Carmel Development Corporation. (Ex. CAW-029, 4:13-5:23.)

These actions as described in more detail in the testimony submitted by CAW reflect that, since 1995, CAW has consistently and actively pursued alternative water supplies. It is beyond reasonable dispute that CAW has and continues to apply constant effort and practical expedition to developing supplemental water.

D. Equitable Estoppel Precludes The Issuance Of A Cease And Desist Order

In the event the Board finds Order 95-10 does not authorize CAW to extract more water than allowed under its water rights, equity estops the Board from subjecting CAW to an enforcement order pursuant to Water Code section 1052. The Board must allow CAW to continue to extract in excess of its water rights.

The California Supreme Court established the rule for applying estoppel against public entities in *City of Long Beach v. Mansell* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 487-501. In that case, the Court began by re-affirming the four elements that must be present in order to apply equitable estoppel:

(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the party asserting estoppel must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.

(Mansell, p. 489.) In Mansell, the Court also established an additional layer of analysis – applying estoppel against a public entity only when "justice and right require it." (Id., p. 493.) Justice and right require estoppel against the government, when "injustice which would result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify an effect upon public interest or policy." (Id., pp. 496-497.) All necessary elements are present here. Substantial injustice will in fact occur, if estoppel is not applied against the Board.

Board, CAW is moving forward to perfect 2,900 acre-feet water right); Ex. CAW-030C, Response 2.1 (CAW's Application No. 30215 remains pending).

First, since the issuance of Order 95-10, CAW consistently provided the Board with extensive reports on CAW's compliance actions, which included evidence that CAW extracted more water than allowed under its water rights. (Exs. CAW 030B - 30WW.)

Second, the Board regularly responded to those reports, which included statements acknowledging the extent of CAW's extractions. (Exs. SWRCB 8-2(a)-(x).) Through these correspondences, the Board was aware CAW extracted more water than allowed under its water rights, repeatedly thanked CAW for its "continued compliance," and even informed CAW that, "if there had been a violation noted, the Division would have promptly advised Cal-Am in order to ensure that the violation was timely addressed." (Ex. SWRCB 8-2(m), p. 1, ¶ 3.) The correspondence to and from the Board were received and sent by numerous representatives of the Board, including Executive Director, Chief of the Division of Water Rights and Board senior engineer. (Ex. SWRCB 8-2.) Therefore, CAW reasonably assumed the Board correspondence represented the position of the Board, and accordingly relied on the representations.

Third, CAW had no reason to believe its actions were outside of the law. The Board is charged with maintaining a stable system of water rights. (Water Code, § 174.) Until the prosecution team commenced this action, CAW had not received any communication from the Board or its staff which would suggest CAW was violating any provision of the Water Code or prior order of the Board. Under the circumstances, CAW did not and should not have known extractions in excess of the quantity allowed under its water rights amounted to a trespass.

Finally, CAW relied upon the Board's Order 95-10 and its subsequent communications. For more than 13 years, the Board required CAW report its actions within the Carmel River Valley. CAW submitted quarterly reports explaining what it had done, what it was doing, and what it planned to do. All of CAW's planning efforts assumed it was authorized to extract more water from the Carmel River than otherwise allowed under its water rights. Based on this understanding, CAW has invested thousands of hours and spent millions of dollars planning long term water supply projects. If the Board now revokes the authorization provided in Order 95-10, the CAW system could be compromised. CAW will not be able to satisfy customer demand, leaving the public-at-large without sufficient supply, and CAW's and the communities' investment in existing water supply planning and

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development efforts may be jeopardized. (See, e.g., CAW-037, pp. 3:25-4:11.)

For these reasons, CAW respectfully submits that the Board is itself estopped from issuing an order in this proceeding. The Board cannot consistently interpret Order 95-10 over the course of 13 years to permit extractions up to the 11,285 acre-foot limit, and then abruptly reverse course to undertake a "gotcha" enforcement action.

V. The Board Does Not Have An Adequate Basis To Adopt The Remedy Proposed By The Prosecution Team; The Only Remedy Supported By The Law And The Record Is One That Allows CAW To Continue To Extract Up To 11,285 Acre-Feet Of Carmel River Water Until Alternative Water Supplies Are Developed

There is no evidence, much less sufficient evidence, to support a finding that CAW has or is threatening to violate condition 2 of Order 95-10. Therefore, the Board cannot adopt a cease and desist order against CAW. However, should the Board decide to issue a cease and desist order, any remedy included therein must be narrowly tailored to address the basis for liability.

The prosecution team and others propose a remedy of further step reductions in CAW extractions. However, they do not present evidence explaining what impact, if any, CAW is causing to public trust resources as a result of the alleged Order 95-10 violation, do not present evidence explaining the benefit bestowed on public trust resources if reductions in CAW extractions occur, do not present evidence explaining CAW can achieve the proposed remedy, and do not present evidence explaining its proposed remedy is protective of public health and safety. For these reasons, the Board cannot adopt the remedy proposed by the prosecution team and others.

Instead, Order 95-10 and the evidence presented during the hearing on this matter support a single remedy – one that allows CAW to continue to extract up to 11,285 acre-feet of Carmel River water until alternative water supplies are developed, provided CAW remains in compliance with Order 95-10. That is the remedy the Board previously determined was needed "to protect public health and safety." (Order 95-10, p. 37.) No evidence presented during this proceeding showed that need has changed.

A. The Evidence Does Not Support A Finding That The Remedy Proposed By The Prosecution Team Protects Public Trust Resources

The prosecution team and others allege the proposed remedy is necessary to protect public

trust resources, including the Central California coast steelhead trout and riparian habitat. (HT2, p. 18:15.) The prosecution team and others advance general statements concerning the effect of CAW's diversions. (See, e.g., Ex. PT-39, p. 4.) Those effects are precisely the same effects previously identified by the Board in Order 95-10. There, the Board explained:

Cal-Am diversions are having an adverse effect on: the riparian corridor along the river below San Clemente Dam at RM 18.5, wildlife which depend on instream flows and riparian habitat, and steelhead which spawn in the river. Interim measures mitigating the effects of Cal-Am diversions undertaken by the District should continue to be implemented. Cal-Am should be required to implement interim measures in the event the District fails to continue with its program. In addition, Cal-Am should be required to implement other mitigation measures. Cal-Am should be required to mitigate the effect of its diversions until such time as it is able to obtain water from the Carmel River or other sources consistent with California water law.

(Order 95-10, p. 39.) Order 95-10 represents the Board's remedy in response to those identified effects identified and calls for mitigation at the levels contemplated in the quotation provided above. (*Id.*, pp. 40-45.) Now, the prosecution team and others might not like the manner in which the Board addressed CAW's effects or the mitigation measures imposed on CAW. However, the time to raise complaints has come and gone. As a matter of law and equity, this enforcement action cannot be used as a collateral attack on Order 95-10.

Furthermore, the general allegations made by the prosecution team and others do not support the proposed remedy. Witnesses testified that reductions in extractions by CAW will benefit steelhead and riparian habitat. That testimony, however, does not survive scrutiny. The witnesses who testified do not have the appropriate expertise. They are not hydrologists or geomorphologists. (See Ex. PT-38.) They lack the expertise to opine on how changes in extractions (subsurface extractions) by CAW could affect surface water flows.

Further, the witnesses recognized that statistical analyses are tools used to establish relationships that withstand peer review, and that correlations are developed for those relationships to determine the strength and direction of relationships. (HT2, p. 151.) Nonetheless, no witness was able to establish such a relationship for the Carmel River or relied upon a previously established relationship to support his/her testimony. (*Id.*) As a result, the prosecution team and others failed to

¹⁹ See Section IV, D. above.

²⁰ Mr. Fife asks if there is anything in Ms. Ambrosius' testimony which quantifies the reduction of diversions on public trust resources, to which Ms. Ambrosius responds: "I do not explicitly get to that." (HT2, p. 115:14-15)

present credible evidence that explains the effect CAW diversions, which exceed the quantity of water available under its water rights, have on Carmel River surface flows. (HT2, pp. 152:14-19, 707:17-23.) And, even if one presumes the proposed reductions in extractions increase Carmel River surface water, no credible evidence was presented to explain how the increase in surface water will improve the abundance (increase population over time) of steelhead or the riparian habitat. (*Id.*, pp. 114:25-115:15.)²⁰

Indeed, the general statements that conditions for steelhead and the riparian habitat will improve if the proposed remedy is adopted by the Board belie the fact that abundance of steelhead are affected by numerous factors, most of which are unrelated to CAW's diversions from the Carmel River. Factors that might affect steelhead include diversions by persons or entities other than CAW, the existence of dams, ocean conditions, natural disasters (forest fires, drought), recreational fishing, natural predation, climate changes, development in the watershed, urban/rural discharges, and introduced non-native species. (*Id.*, pp. 149:9 -151:8.) The general statements that conditions for steelhead and the riparian habitat will improve if the prosecution team's proposed remedy were adopted also belie the fact that, even if there were some marginal benefit, that benefit could be compromised by increases in third-party diversions. (*Id.* pp. 633:9-22, 707:3-9.)

For all of the reasons stated above, the evidence does not support a finding by the Board that the remedy proposed by the prosecution team is needed to protect, or would even benefit, public trust resources.

B. The Prosecution Team's Remedy Will Jeopardize Public Health and Safety

The prosecution team and others recognize that any remedy must protect the health and safety of the Monterey Peninsula residents. The prosecution team and others assert the community on the Monterey Peninsula can withstand significant, additional water supply reductions. That assertion is based principally upon the testimony of an engineer who, although a dedicated public servant, has no municipal experience, no experience operating water utilities, and who, not surprisingly given his lack of experience in the area, makes a number of improper assumptions. The testimony and

 evidence presented by those who have expertise is consistent and unanimous – the remedy proposed by the prosecution team and others will jeopardize public health and safety. That testimony and evidence should not surprise the Board, since it made the same finding in 1995, when it concluded that reductions in CAW diversions beyond those authorized under Order 95-10 would not be sufficient to protect public health or safety. (Order 95-10, p. 37.)

1. The Prosecution Team Made Improper Assumptions Regarding The Minimum Amount Of Water Needed By The Monterey Peninsula

The prosecution team, through Mr. Stretars, presented testimony on the minimum water needs of the Monterey Peninsula. Mr. Stretars has no water planning experience and has never worked for a municipality, a water district, or a water utility. (Ex. PT-23.) Nonetheless, he concluded that the prosecution team's proposed remedy would not jeopardize public health and safety. Mr. Stretars based his determination, in part, on discussions with the California Department of Health Services, Monterey County Department of Health Services, and Title 23 of the California Code of Regulations ("Title 23"). (Ex., PT-49, p. 5; HT2, p. 55:13-25.) Through cross examination, Mr. Stretars conceded the California Department of Health Services did not provide any guidance regarding the quantity of water necessary to protect public health and safety of those on the Monterey Peninsula. (HT2, p. 189 ["We didn't get a real good answer"].) He offered nothing on his discussions with the Monterey County Department of Health Services.

Further, while Mr. Stretars clearly relied upon Title 23 for his opinion, that reliance is clearly misplaced. Mr. Stretars cited Title 23, section 697 for the proposition that 75 gallons per person per day ("gppd") is the minimum per capita residential supply reasonably necessary to protect health and safety. From this, Mr. Stretars determined the minimum amount of water necessary for CAW to avoid jeopardy to the public's health and safety by multiplying 75 gppd by the census population (approximately 110,000 people). (*Id.*, p. 172:2-6.) Upon cross examination, it became evident Mr. Stretars' calculation was oversimplified.

Title 23 categorizes water use, providing minimum requirements for in-home (i.e., fully plumbed), resorts, motels, residential landscape, etc. (Ex. CAW-041.) Mr. Stretars recognized this categorization and testified he believed residential use (in-home and landscape) made up

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approximately 60 percent of total use, with the remaining 40 percent dedicated to all other uses (*i.e.*, other uses identified in section 697). (HT2, p. 109:8-14.) However, his calculation, admittedly, accounted only for in-home use and provided no water for any of the remaining uses. Mr. Stretars' testimony was not clear whether his calculation intended an immediate and complete moratorium on all non-in-home uses or whether his calculation intended all uses to be included in the in-home use calculation, forcing further reductions in in-home uses to accommodate for the remaining uses. (*Id.*, pp. 109:15-112:20, 803:3-804:1.) In either case, the calculation performed by Mr. Stretars and relied upon by the prosecution team does not add up. The prosecution team's conclusion that its proposed remedy will not jeopardize public health and safety does not withstand scrutiny.

In addition to the error noted above, the prosecution team ignored other important factors that should have been considered when assessing whether the proposed remedy might jeopardize public health and safety. Three important examples are the prosecution team's failure to consult the Department of Public Health, consider the impact on the CAW distribution system, and consider the impact in context with the Seaside Basin Adjudication. (HT2, pp. 56:9-14, 164:4-9, 169:3-10.)²¹

The Department of Public Health regulates drinking water standards and water systems to ensure public health. (California Health and Safety Code § 116270 et seq.) In order for the CAW system to properly function and comply with Department of Health Services' requirements, a specific pressure must be maintained. (HT2, p. 1261:18-22.) However, the prosecution team did not consider these requirements when developing its proposed remedy. (Id., p. 167:19-23.) Also, the proposed reduction of extractions may result in reduced pressure in the CAW system, which may compromise ability to provide necessary public services (i.e. fire hydrant pressure). (CAW-037, pp. 3:28-4:14.) Finally, as also discussed in subsection 2 immediately below, the prosecution team completely ignores the fact that it is proposing further reductions in CAW's available supplies at a time when CAW must respond to reductions caused by the Seaside Basin Adjudication. (Id.; see also Ex. CAW-05.)

²¹ Citation to Mr. Stretars testimony which includes total water available from the Seaside Basin. At no point does Mr. Stretars account for the Seaside Basin Adjudication.

The Prosecution Team Made Improper Assumptions Regarding The Supply Of 2. Water Available To The Community On The Monterey Peninsula

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To support its position that the proposed remedy would not jeopardize public health and safety, the prosecution team identified and relied upon a number of projects and conservation measures, which it believed are "immediately achievable." While the projects and measures are real, the prosecution team's reliance upon them is again misplaced.

For example, Mr. Stretars' testimony states the City of Sand City desalination project will yield 300 acre-feet of water which can immediately be used to reduce CAW extractions from the Carmel River. However, on cross examination, Mr. Stretars conceded he did not know when the Sand City plant would be completed and did not adequately account for the fact that the quantity of water available to CAW would decrease over time. (HT2, pp. 187:15-25, 95:11-16.)

Similarly, Mr. Stretars assumed CAW would be able to immediately reduce its extractions from the Carmel River by 920 acre-feet because of Phase 1 ASR. Mr. Stretars assumed the 920 acrefeet would be available every year. (HT2, pp. 53:18-20, 92:2-93:16.) Mr. Stretars conceded he did "not specifically" know how much water Phase 1 ASR currently yields. (*Id.*, p. 91:15-18.) Witnesses from MPWMD explained the Phase 1 ASR 920 acre-feet yield is the estimated annual average and the actual water available could range annually from zero to 1,500 acre-feet. (Id., p. 816:18-21.)

Further, Mr. Stretars estimated CAW could "save" an additional 549 acre-feet through (Ex. PT-49, p. 2.) It became clear during cross-examination that unaccounted for water. Mr. Stretars' estimate of unaccounted for water was made with very little understanding of the CAW system; he understood that addressing the amount of unaccounted for water might result in water sayings, but conceded he was unable to identify the type of actions required to reduce unaccounted for water and therefore was not aware of the time and cost required to undertake the needed improvements. (HT2, pp. 167:19-23, 186:3-24, 101:16-103:24.)

In addition, Mr. Stretars alleged CAW could reduce its extractions by 15 percent if it were required to operate under the MPWMD's Stage 3 conservation. (Id., p. 180:12-17.) Mr. Stretars' calculation did not account for a fact he conceded: staged conservation does not result in guaranteed savings, but encourages action that might reduce water use. (Id., p. 180:7-11.) Also, the witnesses

for MPWMD explained Stage 3 conservation is not intended to reduce water use below the 11,285 acrefeet. (*Id.*, p. 806:6-21.) It allows for measures to be taken to bring water use to the 11,285 acrefoot limit, when projected use might exceed that limitation. (*Id.*)

Finally and as noted above, the prosecution team fails to place into context CAW's Carmel River extractions, the project discussed above, and the Seaside Basin Adjudication. Evidence presented during the hearing reflects the fact that supply of water from the Seaside Basin available to CAW has decreased and will continue to decrease. (*See* Ex. CAW-005.) The prosecution team does not explain how the further reductions it now proposes, in conjunction with the Seaside Basin reductions, will not jeopardize public health and safety.

3. <u>If Adopted By The Board, The Remedy Proposed By The Prosecution Team, Would Impose Obligations On CAW That It Cannot Assume Without Violating The Law</u>

The prosecution team alleges its proposed remedy is "immediately achievable." (HT2, pp 175:21-176:2.) That however is not true, unless CAW violates its existing legal mandates. As a public utility, the CPUC has primary jurisdiction over CAW and CAW cannot discontinue water service, unless ordered by the CPUC.²² (Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 451.) Likewise, CAW requires action by the CPUC to implement a moratorium or otherwise ban new water service. (*Id. See also* Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 2708.) In fact, the CPUC oversees all of CAW's business. Thus, as a CPUC regulated entity, CAW cannot unilaterally comply with a cease and desist as proposed by the prosecution team and others.

4. <u>Witnesses With Expertise Consistently and Uniformly Testified The Remedy Proposed By The Prosecution Team Will Harm Public Health and Safety</u>

Witnesses with experience operating water utilities and with municipal experience consistently and uniformly testified the remedy proposed by the prosecution team will harm public health and safety. The Director of Engineering for CAW, Mark Schubert, explained how the remedy proposed by the prosecution team and others would place public health and safety at risk. Mr. Schubert also explained the proposed remedy would result, at least at times, in CAW having simply

Due to page restrictions, CAW was unable to fully brief the law applicable to CAW as an entity regulated by the CPUC. CAW anticipates more extensive briefing on this topic in its reply brief.

insufficient supplies to meet the demands of its customers. (Ex. CAW-037.)

Mr. Schubert explained further the step reductions proposed by the prosecution team and others could compromise CAW's ability to deliver potable water. Mr. Schubert highlighted some concerns, which included CAW's ability to maintain an operational distribution system, as well as maintain a system that delivers water consistent with CPUC and California Department of Public Health standards. (Ex. CAW-037.)

In addition, the cities of Seaside, Sand City, Monterey, and Carmel each sent its mayor to testify. They all presented testimony which explains why the remedy proposed by the prosecution team and others would jeopardize public health and safety. (HT2, pp. 363:18-364:1, 406:25-408:11, 444:25-445:23, 464:1-12, 467:1-14, 444:9-22, 399:19-400:10, 442:19-444:3, 466:14-25, 397:17-398:3, 446:2-20, 464:13-16, 804:19-24.) These statements by the representatives of the municipalities should not be surprising; the Board drew the same conclusion in Order 95-10. The Board determined that, to protect the public health and safety, CAW was required to continue diversion in excess of its water rights, up to the 11,285 acre-foot limit. (Order 95-10, p. 40.)

C. The Only Appropriate Remedy In This Case Is One That Allows CAW To Continue To Extract Up To 11,285 Acre-Feet Of Carmel River Water Until An Alternative Water Supply Is Developed, Provided That CAW Remains In Compliance With Order 95-10

The overwhelming evidence demonstrates the existing regulatory oversight of CAW is sufficient during the interim period CAW pursues alternative water supplies. There is no doubt the Board maintains control through the mitigation, conservation and operations controls in Order 95-10. In addition, other measures are in place. For example, CAW extractions are governed by a memorandum of agreement among California Department of Fish and Game ("CDFG"), the NMFS and MPWMD. (Exhibit MPWMD-1, pp. 13:26-14:9.) CAW, MPWMD, CDFG, and NMFS develop quarterly water budgets that guide CAW's extractions. (*Id.*, p. 8:21-24.) And, NMFS and CAW have entered into a conservation agreement and settlement agreement. (Ex. PT 47; Ex. PT 48.

With these regulatory controls in place, the steelhead and riparian habitat have improved significantly. The evidence in the record cannot reasonably be refuted. Indeed, the prosecution team's witness Joyce Ambrosius, a fisheries biologist with NMFS, attested that the steelhead

1 population has significantly recovered. (HT2, p. 125:1-10.) Witnesses for the Carmel River 2 Steelhead Association concede fish counts in recent years mark a 60-year high. (Id., p. 614:21-24.) 3 And, experts for the MPWMD testified riparian habitat and the steelhead populations are more robust today than they were in 1995. (Id., pp. 764:18-21, 780:6-16.) For the reasons stated above, including those stated in other sections of this brief, the only remedy supported by law and the record is one 6 that allows CAW to continue to extract up to 11,285 acre-feet of Carmel River water until it develops 7 alternative water supplies. 8 VI. This Proceeding Violated CAW's Due Process Rights 9 CAW maintains its objection that this proceeding has violated CAW's right to due process.²³ 10 The bases for CAW's objections were renewed during the proceeding. For example, the president of 11 CAW, Kent Turner, testified that, during the time the prosecution team evaluated the merits of its 12 case, Mr. Turner attended a meeting with Board staff that included Buck Taylor, counsel to and 13 member of the hearing team, and Kathy Mrowka, a member of the prosecution team. (HT1, pp. 93:2-14 94:4, 455:19-456:23.) At the meeting, CAW's compliance with Order 95-10 was discussed. (Id.) 15 Shortly thereafter, the prosecution team issued its draft cease and desist order. At a minimum, this 16 series of events reflects an improper mixing of advisory and prosecutorial roles. This action must be 17 dismissed for failure to afford CAW due process. 18 VII. Conclusion 19 For the reasons stated above, the Board cannot and should not issue a cease and desist order 20 against CAW. 21 Respectfully submitted, Dated: October 9, 2008 22 DIEPENBROCK HARRISON A Professional Corporation 23 24 JON D. RUBIN 25 Attorneys for California American Water Company } {00130303: 1

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²³ See Motion to Ensure Due Process, filed with the Board on April 23, 2008, which CAW hereby incorporates herein by this reference (a copy of the Motion is attached as Attachment 3); letter from CAW to Hearing Officers Baggett and Wolff, filed June 9, 2008, which CAW hereby incorporates herein by this reference (a copy of the letter is attached as Attachment 4).

PROOF OF SERVICE

.	Y 41 C.11			
1	I declare as follows:			
2	I am over 18 years of age and not a party to the within action; my business address is 40			
3	Capitol 1	Mall, Suite 1800, Sacramento, California, I am employed in Sacramento County,		
4	California	1.		
5	O ₁	n October 9, 2008, I served a copy of the foregoing document following document entitled		
6	CLOSIN	G BRIEF on the following interested parties in the above-referenced case number to the		
7	following			
8		See Attached Service List of Participants		
9	[X]	BY MAIL		
10		By following ordinary business practice, placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, for collection and mailing with the United States Postal Service where it would be deposited for first class delivery, postage fully prepaid, in the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business as indicated in the attached Service List of Participants and noted as "Service by Mail."		
11		Service that same day in the ordinary course of business as indicated in the attached Service List of Participants and noted as " <u>Service by Mail</u> ."		
12	LXJ .	ELECTRONIC MAII		
13		I caused a true and correct scanned image (.PDF file) copy to be transmitted via the electronic mail transfer system in place at Diepenbrock Harrison, originating from the undersigned at 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1800, Sacramento, California, to the e-mail address(es) indicated in the attached Service List of Participants and noted by "Service		
14		by Electronic Mail		
15 16		BY FACSIMILE at a.m./p.m. to the fax number(s) listed above. The facsimile machine I used complied with California Rules of Court, rule 2003 and no error was reported by the machine. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 2006(d), I approach the machine to print a transmission record of the transmission as any of which is		
17		caused the machine to print a transmission record of the transmission, a copy of which is attached to this declaration. [] A true and correct copy was also forwarded by regular U.S. Mail by following		
18		ordinary business practice, placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, for collection and mailing with the United States Postal Service where it would be deposited for first-class delivery, postage fully prepaid, in the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business.		
19	ΓΊ	RY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY		
20		[] Federal Express [] Golden State Overnight Depositing copies of the above documents in a box or other facility regularly maintained by Federal Express, or Golden State Overnight, in an envelope or package designated by Federal Express or Golden State Overnight with delivery fees paid or provided for.		
21		Federal Express, or Golden State Overnight, in an envelope or package designated by Federal Express or Golden State Overnight with delivery fees paid or provided for.		
22	[]	PERSONAL SERVICE [] via process server		
23		[] via hand by		
24	I	certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing		
25	is true ar	nd correct and that this declaration was executed on October 9, 2008, at Sacramento		
26	California	a. Strath V-Chushi		
27		Jolanthe V. Onishi		
28				

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CLOSING BRIEF

DIEPENBROCK

HARRISON

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

CALIFORNIA AMERICAN WATER CEASE AND DESIST ORDER JUNE 19, 2008 HEARING SERVICE LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 3 Service by Electronic Mail: 4 **Division of Ratepayer Advocates** State Water Resources Control Board Andrew Ulmer Reed Sato 5 Water Rights Prosecution Team Division of Ratepayer Advocates California Public Utilities Commission 1001 I Street 6 Sacramento, CA 95814 505 Van Ness Avenue San Francisco, CA 94102 (916) 341-5889 7 (415) 703-2056 rsato@waterboards.ca.gov eau@cpuc.ca.gov 8 **Public Trust Alliance** Sierra Club - Ventana Chapter 9 Michael Warburton Laurens Silver California Environmental Law Project Resource Renewal Institute 10 Room 290, Building D P.O. Box 667 Mill Valley, CA 94942 Fort Mason Center. 11 San Francisco, CA 94123 (415) 383-7734 larrysilver@earthlink.net Michael@rri.org 12 igwill@dcn.davis.ca.us 13 Carmel River Steelhead Association California Sportfishing Protection Michael B. Jackson Alliance 14 P.O. Box 207 Michael B. Jackson Ouincy, CA 95971 P. O. Box 207 15 (530) 283-1007 Ouincy, CA 95971 (530) 283-1007 mjatty@sbcglobal.net 16 miatty@sbcglobal.net 17 City of Seaside The Seaside Basin Watermaster Russell M. McGlothlin Russell M. McGlothlin 18 Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber, Schreck Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber, Schreck 21 East Carrillo Street 21 East Carrillo Street 19 Santa Barbara, CA 93101 Santa Barbara, CA 93101 (805) 963-7000 (805) 963-7000 20 RMcGlothlin@BHFS.com RMcGlothlin@BHFS.com 21 **National Marine Fisheries Service** Pebble Beach Company Thomas H. Jamison Christopher Keifer 22 501 W. Ocean Blvd., Suite 4470 Fenton & Keller Long Beach, CA 90802 P.O. Box 791 23 Monterey, CA 93942-0791 (562) 950-4076 (831) 373-1241 christopher.keifer@noaa.gov 24 TJamison@FentonKeller.com 25 26 27

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1	Service by Electronic-Mail (Cont.'):	
2 3	Monterey County Hospitality Association Bob McKenzie	California Salmon and Steelhead Association
4	P.O. Box 223542 Carmel, CA 93922 (831) 626-8636	Bob Baiocchi P.O. Box 1790 Graeagle, CA 96103
5	info@mcha.net bobmck@mbay.net	(530) 836-1115 rbaiocchi@gotsky.com
6		
7	Planning and Conservation League Jonas Minton	City of Sand City James G. Heisinger, Jr.
8	1107 9th Street, Suite 360 Sacramento, CA 95814	Heisinger, Buck & Morris P.O. Box 5427
9 10	(916) 719-4049 jminton@pcl.org	Carmel, CA 93921 (831) 624-3891 hbm@carmellaw.com
		nom(a)carmonaw.com
11	Monterey Peninsula Water Management District	
12	David C. Laredo De Lay & Laredo	
13	606 Forest Avenue Pacific Grove, CA 93950	
14	(831) 646-1502 <u>dave@laredolaw.net</u>	
15		
16 17	Service By Mail:	
18	City of Carmel-by-the-Sea	
19	Donald G. Freeman P.O. Box CC	
20	Carmel-by-the-Sea, CA 93921 (831) 624-5339 ext. 11	
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ATTACHMENT 1

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A. California American Water Company

CAW is a California corporation authorized to conduct business in the state of California. (Exhibit CAW-019 (Declaration of B. Kent Turner), filed concurrently herewith, p. 1.) It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Water Works Company, Inc. (Exhibit CAW-019 (Declaration of B. Kent Turner), p. 1.) CAW has been issued a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity by the California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") to operate as a Class A regulated water and wastewater utility. (Exhibit CAW-019 (Declaration of B. Kent Turner), p. 1.) CAW collects, treats, and distributes water for public and private use and consumption. (Exhibit CAW-019 (Declaration of B. Kent Turner, p. 1.) CAW provides water service to most of the Monterey Peninsula, including the cities of Carnel, Del Rey Oaks, Monterey, Pacific Grove, Sand City and Seaside. (Exhibit CAW-019 (Declaration of B. Kent Turner), p. 2.) In addition, CAW services the unincorporated areas of the Carmel Valley and the Highway 68 corridor. (Exhibit CAW-019 (Declaration of B. Kent Turner), p. 2.) Public Utilities Code section 451 requires CAW, as a regulated public utility to furnish water to customers within its service area. (See Hotchkiss v. Moran (1930) 109 Cal. App. 321; W. H. Brockmann v. Smithson Springs Water Co. (1957) 56 Cal.P.U.C. 28.) CAW's mission is to provide a safe, reliable, and affordable water supply to its customers. (Exhibit CAW-019 (Declaration of B. Kent Turner), p. 1.) Without sufficient water supplies, the health and safety of CAW's customers is jeopardized – a fact recognized by the State Water Board in Order 95-10. (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), p. 37.)

B. Water Rights Order 95-10

1. Order 95-10

Between 1987 and 1991, the Carmel Steelhead Association, Resident's Water Committee ("RWC"), Sierra Club, and California Department of Parks and Recreation ("DPR"), each filed a complaint against CAW. (Exhibit CAW-001 (Carmel Steelhead Association Complaint); Exhibit CAW-002 (Resident's Water Committee Complaint); Exhibit CAW-003 (Department of Parks and Recreation Complaint); and Exhibit CAW-004 (Sierra Club Complaint).) These complaints alleged, at least in part: (1) CAW's diversions of Carmel River water were unauthorized; (2) the

unauthorized diversions were unreasonable; and (3) the diversions caused harm to public trust resources, including steelhead and other fisheries, wildlife, and riparian habitat. (Exhibit CAW-001 (Carmel Steelhead Association Complaint); Exhibit CAW-002 (Resident's Water Committee Complaint); Exhibit CAW-003 (Department of Parks and Recreation Complaint); and Exhibit CAW-004 (Sierra Club Complaint).)

The State Water Board, in Order 95-10, addressed each of those complaints. It determined that, although CAW held water rights to 3,376 acre-feet per year from the Carmel River, CAW would be authorized to divert up to 14,106 acre-feet per year. (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), p. 40.) When providing that authorization, the State Water Board imposed on CAW thirteen conditions, one of which has now reduced the amount of water CAW can divert from the Carmel River to 11,285 acre-feet per year – a 20 percent reduction from 14,106 acre-feet. (See Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), p. 40.) The State Water Board imposed other conditions that require CAW to take actions to mitigate for potential, continued impacts of its diversions on public trust resources. (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), pp. 40-44.) In Order 95-10, the State Water Board acknowledged that the "physical solution" it developed was necessary because "[t]he people and businesses on the Monterey Peninsula must continue to be served water from the Carmel River in order to protect public health and safety." (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), p. 37.)

2. Litigation Challenging Order 95-10

CAW, Monterey Peninsula Water Management District ("MPWMD"), Sierra Club, Carmel Steelhead Association, and CalSPA filed petitions for writ of mandate in Monterey County Superior Court challenging Order 95-10. (Staff Exhibit 4 (Water Board Order No. WR 98-04 ("Order 98-04"), pp. 1-2.) On February 19, 1998 reflecting *, the State Water Board issued Order 98-04. Order 98-04 was based in significant part, on a settlement reached among the parties to that litigation. As a result of the State Water Board issuing Order 95-10, the parties to dismiss their actions with prejudice (See Staff Exhibit (Order 98-4), pp. 2-6; Exhibit CAW-017 (Order Cases nos. M33519, M33520, and 105610, June 6, 1998).

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3. Order 98-04, WR Order 2001-04, And WRO 2002-0002

The State Water Board issued Order 98-04 on February 19, 1998. (Staff Exhibit 4 (Order 98-04), p. 6.) Order 98-04 modified Conditions 4, 5, 6, and 13 of Order 95-10. (Staff Exhibit 4 (Order 98-04), pp. 4-5) As modified, Condition 4 directed CAW to maximize production from the Seaside Aquifer during periods of low flow and minimize production from the Seaside Aquifer during periods of flow above 40 cubic feet per second.² (Staff Exhibit 4 (Order 98-04), p. 4.) Condition 5 was modified to require extraction from downstream wells to the maximum extent feasible "without inducing sea water intrusion." (Staff Exhibit 4 (Order 98-04), p. 4.) Condition 13 was modified to include a reporting requirement which detailed the total amount being pumped from wells and indicate the location and amount pumped from each well. (Staff Exhibit 4 (Order 98-04), p. 5.) The modified Condition 13 also required CAW to submit a quarterly water budget. (Staff Exhibit 4 (Order 98-04), p. 5.)

As modified, Condition 6 required CAW to conduct two studies to evaluate the feasibility, benefits, and costs of alternatives to using the Carmel Valley Filter Plant ("CVFP") to provide more surface flow to the Carmel River. (Staff Exhibit 4 (Order 98-04), p. 4.) Specifically, Condition 6 required: (1) a study on supplying water from downstream wells to areas now served by the CVFP, and (2) a study on utilizing the Begonia Treatment Plant in lieu of the CVFP. (Staff Exhibit 4 (Order 98-04), p. 4.) CAW completed the first study prior to the State Water Board's issuance of Order 98-04. (Exhibit CAW-006 (State Water Board Order No. WR 2001-04-DWR ("Order 2001-04")), p. 8, fn. 4.) CAW also prepared the study on utilization of the Begonia Treatment Plant. (Exhibit CAW-006 (Order 2001-04), p. 8.) Condition 6 required CAW to provide an opportunity for comment. (Staff Exhibit 4 (Order 98-04), p. 4.) A number of entities and one person provided the State Water Board with comments on findings of the Begonia Treatment Plant study. (Exhibit CAW-006 (Order 2001-04), p. 8.)

Thereafter, on April 18, 2001, upon consideration of the submitted comments, the State

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² On March 27, 2006, the Superior Court issued a final decision in an adjudication of the Seaside Basin. That decision will likely cause CAW to reduce over time its appropriation of water from the Seaside Basin. (Exhibit CAW-005 (Seaside Basin Adjudication).)

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Board issued Order 2001-04. (Exhibit CAW-006 (Order 2001-04).) Order 2001-04 imposed additional conditions that required CAW to modify its diversion practices. (Exhibit CAW-006 (Order 2001-04), pp. 17-18.) Petitions for reconsideration of Order 2001-04 were filed by CAW, the Carmel Steelhead Association, MPWMD, and the Sierra Club. (Staff Exhibit 5 (State Water Board Order No. WRO 2002-0002 ("Order 2002-02")), p. 4.) The State Water Board granted the petitions for reconsideration and held a hearing to consider whether Order 2001-04 should be modified. (Staff Exhibit 5 (Order 2002-02), p. 4.) As a result of that hearing, the State Water Board issued Order 2002-02. Through that Order, the State Water Board rescinded Order 2001-04 and established a new set of requirements CAW needed to meet to comply with Condition 6 of Order 95-10. (Staff Exhibit 5 (Order 2002-02), pp. 17-20.)

C. Notice of Draft Cease and Desist Order

On January 15, 2008, Mr. Kassel, Assistant Deputy Director for Water Rights for the State Water Board, sent a letter to Mr. Turner, president of CAW, providing CAW with notice that Mr. Kassel intended to pursue an enforcement action against CAW. (Exhibit CAW-007 (Letter from James Kassel), p. 1.) In his letter, Mr. Kassel indicated that he approved the issuance of a draft cease and desist order because the "Division staff determined that in the twelve years since Order 95-10 was adopted, [CAW] has not complied with Condition 2 of that Order." (Exhibit CAW-007 (Letter from James Kassel), p. 1.) Mr. Kassel enclosed with his letter a draft cease and desist order ("Draft CDO"). The Draft CDO contained proposed findings to support Mr. Kassel's view that CAW has not complied with Order 95-10. (Staff Exhibit 7 (Draft CDO), p. 5.) It also proposed a schedule of mandatory CAW diversion reductions. (Staff Exhibit 7 (Draft CDO), p. 5.) As required by law, Mr. Kassel provided CAW with 20 days to request a hearing before the State Water Board. (Exhibit CAW-007 (Letter from James Kassel), p. 1.)

On February 4, 2008, CAW timely responded to Mr. Kassel's letter, requesting a hearing on the Draft CDO. (Exhibit CAW-008 (Letter from Jon D. Rubin).) Shortly thereafter, on February 22, 2008, the State Water Board informally provided notice that it would hold a pre-hearing conference, a meeting to receive public policy statements, and an evidentiary hearing. (Exhibit CAW-009 (Letter from Charles L. Lindsay).) The State Water Board provided official notice of the

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pre-hearing conference, the meeting to receive public policy statements, and the hearing on March 5, 2008. (Exhibit CAW-010 (Official Notice of Hearing), p. 1.)

The State Water Board's official notice for this hearing maintains the same focus as Mr. Kassel's letter and the Draft CDO. In the official notice, the State Water Board describes why it issued the Draft CDO and what requirements it imposed on CAW through Order 95-10. (Exhibit CAW-010 (Official Notice of Hearing), p. 2.) Then, the State Water Board describes the Draft CDO. Those statements are followed by a presentation of the key issue:

Should the State Water Board adopt the draft CDO? If the draft CDO should be adopted, should any modifications be made to the measures in the draft order? What is the basis for each modification?

(Exhibit CAW-010 (Official Notice of Hearing), p. 3.)

In addition, the notice identified the State Water Board prosecutorial team and CAW as the two parties to this hearing.³ (Exhibit CAW-011 (Information Regarding Appearance), p. 1.) It acknowledged that non-party person or entities "may participate as authorized by the hearing officer." (Exhibit CAW-011 (Information Regarding Appearance), p. 1.) Upon receipt of the hearing notice, 18 non-party entities expressed interest in intervening in this hearing by filing notices of intent to appear. The State Water Board held the pre-hearing conference on March 19, 2008. During the pre-hearing conference, Hearing Officer Baggett confirmed that the current scope of the hearing concerned a single issue: whether CAW has violated Condition 2 of Order 95-10. (Exhibit CAW-018 (Certified Pre-hearing Conference Transcript ("Pre-hearing Transcript")), p. 39, ln. 24-25.) Hearing Officer Baggett stated that whether CAW has violated Condition 2 of 95-10 is "the current scope of this proceeding." (Exhibit CAW-018 (Pre-hearing Transcript), p. 39, ln. 24-25).

Notwithstanding that statement, non-party entities the Sierra Club, CalSPA, Carmel Steelhead Association, California Salmon and Steelhead Association, and the Public Trust Alliance requested an expansion of the hearing's scope. (Exhibit CAW-018 (Pre-hearing Transcript), p. 22,

³ CAW is concerned that the State Water Board may not afford it due process in this hearing. CAW reserves its right to file a motion asserting that its due process rights may be violated due to the composition of the State Water Board's prosecutorial and hearing teams.

[R]eopen basically [Order 95-10]. Reopen the hearing. Take new evidence in on [sic] the state and the condition of the river. . . And that wouldn't be as quick as just dealing with the narrow issue of the cease and desist, which is before us now. It's much narrower than opening up the whole proceeding.

(Exhibit CAW-018 (Pre-hearing Transcript), p. 27, ln. 8-16).

III. Scope of Hearing

A. Law and Equity Demand That The Scope Of This Hearing Remain Limited To The Issue of Whether CAW Has Violated Order 95-10

It is beyond reasonable argument that the existing scope of this hearing is limited to a single issue: whether CAW has violated condition 2 of Order 95-10. The notice provided by Mr. Kassel on January 15, 2008, (Exhibit CAW-007 (Letter from James Kassel)), the notice provided by the State Water Board on March 5, 2008, (Exhibit CAW-010 (Official Notice of Hearing)), and Hearing Officer Baggett's statements on March 19, 2008, (Exhibit CAW-019 (Pre-Hearing Transcript)) establish and confirm that scope. Nothing in the record suggests that the State Water Board would consider any other issues.

The State Water Board is now faced with requests by non-party entities the Sierra Club, CalSPA, Carmel Steelhead Association, California Salmon and Steelhead Association, and the Public Trust Alliance that ask the State Water Board to conduct a much more expansive hearing. (Exhibit CAW-018 (Pre-hearing Transcript), p. 22, ln. 11-13; p. 25, ln. 19-21; p.33, ln. 9-11; p.34, ln. 6-8.) Law and equity require the scope to remain as currently defined.

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The Water Code, State Water Board regulations, due process protections, well-established principles on intervention, and the legal doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata all demand that the State Water Board not change the scope of the hearing. The policies underlying the legal doctrines of collateral esoppel and res judicata, such as equity and economy of the hearing, also deter the re-visiting of previously resolved issues.⁴ Thus, the request of non-party entities Sierra

⁴ Similarly, the Water Code encourages use of preclusion where appropriate. (See generally, Wat. Code, § 1850 ["determinations made pursuant to a cease and desist order shall be conclusive and shall preclude any party to the order from raising those issues in any subsequent administrative proceeding"].)

ATTACHMENT 2

Cease and Desist Order Hearing for California American Water Carmel River in Monterey County

Index of <u>Exhibit SWRCB 8-2</u> (Single exhibit that includes 24 Board responses to CAW quarterly reports)

Exhibit No.	Description
SWRCB 8-2(a)	December 21, 1995 Letter to California American Water Company from Katherine Mrowka, Associate WRC Engineer
SWRCB 8-2(b)	December 26, 1995 Letter to Larry Foy, California American Water Company from Edward C. Anton, Chief Division of Water Rights
SWRCB 8-2(c)	March 11, 1996 Letter to Larry Foy, California American Water Company from Edward C. Anton, Chief Division of Water Rights
SWRCB 8-2(d)	March 11, 1996 Letter to California American Water Company from Katherine Mrowka, Associate WRC Engineer
SWRCB 8-2(e)	September 12, 1996 Letter to Larry Foy, California-American Water Company from Edward C. Anton, Chief Division of Water Rights
SWRCB 8-2(f)	September 20, 1996 Letter to Larry Foy, California American Water Company from Edward C. Anton, Chief Division of Water Rights
SWRCB 8-2(g)	September 20, 1996 Letter to California American Water Company from Katherine Mrowka, Associate WRC Engineer
SWRCB 8-2(h)	May 15, 1997 Letter to Larry Foy, California American Water Company from Walt Pettit, Director
SWRCB 8-2(i)	May 15, 1997 Letter to Larry Foy, California American Water Company from Walt Pettit, Director
SWRCB 8-2(j)	May 5, 1997 Letter to Larry D. Foy, California American Water Company from Edward Anton, Chief Division of Water Rights
SWRCB 8-2(k)	April 17, 1998 Letter to Larry D. Foy, California American Water Company from Edward Anton, Chief Division of Water Rights

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Cease and Desist Order Hearing for California American Water Carmel River in Monterey County

Index of <u>Exhibit SWRCB 8-2</u> (Single exhibit that includes 24 Board responses to CAW quarterly reports)

Exhibit No.	Description	
SWRCB 8-2(l)	November 3, 1998 Letter to Larry Foy, California American Water Company from Harry Schueller, Chief Division of Water Rights	
SWRCB 8-2(m)	November 3, 1998 Letter to Larry Foy, California American Water Company from Harry Schueller, Chief Division of Water Rights	
SWRCB 8-2(n)	September 2, 1999 Letter to Judy Almond, California American Water Company from Katherine Mrowka, Senior Hearings Engineer	
SWRCB 8-2(o)	March 27, 2001 Letter to Terry Ryan, California American Water Company from Harry Schueller, Chief Division of Water Rights	
SWRCB 8-2(p)	November 14, 2001 Letter to Judith Almond, California American Water Company from Edward Anton, Chief Division of Water Rights	
SWRCB 8-2(q)	February 4, 2005 Letter to Steven Leonard, California American Water Company from Katherine Mrowka, Chief Watershed Unit 3	
SWRCB 8-2(r)	February 4, 2005 Letter to Steven Leonard, California American Water Company from Katherine Mrowka, Chief Watershed Unit 3	
SWRCB 8-2(s)	May 20, 2005 Letter to Steven Leonard, California American Water Company from Katherine Mrowka, Chief Watershed Unit 3	
SWRCB 8-2(t)	September 13, 2005 Letter to Steven Leonard, California American Water Company from Victoria Whitney, Division Chief	
SWRCB 8-2(u)	November 16, 2005 Letter to Steven Leonard, California American Water Company from Katherine Mrowka, Chief Watershed Unit 3	
SWRCB 8-2(v)	March 2, 2006 Letter to Steven Leonard, California American Water Company from Victoria Whitney, Division Chief	


{00130259; 1} Page 2 of 3

Cease and Desist Order Hearing for California American Water Carmel River in Monterey County

Index of <u>Exhibit SWRCB 8-2</u> (Single exhibit that includes 24 Board responses to CAW quarterly reports)

Exhibit No.	Description
SWRCB 8-2(w)	August 17, 2006 Letter to Steven Leonard, California American Water Company from Katherine Mrowka, Chief Watershed Unit 3
SWRCB 8-2(x)	March 15, 2007 Letter to Steven Leonard, California American Water Company from Victoria Whitney, Division Chief

{00130259, 1} Page 3 of 3



JON D. RUBIN, State Bar No. 196944
JONATHAN R. MARZ, State Bar No. 221188
VALERIE C. KINCAID, State Bar No. 231815
DIEPENBROCK HARRISON
A Professional Corporation
400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1800
Sacramento, CA 95814-4413
Telephone: (916) 492-5000
Facsimile: (916) 446-4535

Attorneys for California American
Water Company

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THE PARTY NAMED IN

BEFORE THE CALIFORNIA

STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD

In the Matter of Draft Cease and Desist Order No. 2008-00XX-DWR Against California American Water Company.

MOTION BY CALIFORNIA AMERICAN WATER COMPANY TO ENSURE DUE PROCESS

I. Introduction

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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that California American Water Company ("CAW") hereby moves the State Water Resources Control Board ("State Water Board") for an order demonstrating that CAW will be afforded due process. CAW is before the State Water Board because Mr. James W. Kassel and other State Water Board staff are seeking a cease and desist order against CAW. The draft cease and desist order proposed by Mr. Kassel alleges CAW violated Condition 2 of State Water Board Order No. 95-10 ("Order 95-10"). It proposes a remedy that threatens the economy of the Monterey Peninsula, and the health and safety of its residents. In part because Mr. Kassel incorrectly concludes that the State Water Board should issue a cease and desist order (incorrectly concludes that CAW violated Condition 2 of Order 95-10), and, to protect against the inevitable harm to the Monterey Peninsula if the State Water Board were to issue the proposed cease and desist order, CAW requested that the State Water Board conduct a formal hearing on that issue.

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HARRISON ATTORNEYS AT LAW 1 2 c 3 ri 4 S 5 a

When conducting such a hearing, the State Water Board must afford CAW its constitutionally afforded due process protections. At this time, the structure of the proceeding gives rise to concerns that such protections do not exist in this proceeding. CAW therefore requests the State Water Board take the necessary steps to ensure CAW receives a fair hearing; one without the appearance of bias. CAW recognizes that in order for the State Water Board to do that, it may be required to disqualify members of the State Water Board staff from this proceeding.¹

II. The Current Structure Of This Hearing May Cause The State Water Board To Violate CAW's Due Process Protections

A. Due Process Protections Must Be Afforded In Administrative Adjudications

The Constitutional provisions affording due process require administrative agencies to provide a fair and impartial system for adjudicatory proceedings. (*Richardson v. Perales* (1971) 402 U.S. 389, 401 [due process protections apply to administrative proceedings]; *Haas v. County of San Bernardino* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1017, 1025 ("*Haas*") ["Speaking of administrative hearings, and articulating the procedural requirements "demanded by rudimentary due process" in that setting, the court has said that, "of course an impartial decision maker is essential."] (quoting *Goldberg v. Kelly* (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 271).)

A hearing may run afoul of due process protections, not only if there is a showing of actual bias but also when there is an appearance of bias. (Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Board, 153 Cal.App.4th 202, 210 ("Morongo") [actual bias is no longer the "touchstone for disqualification in administrative hearings."]; Haas, p. 1029 ["We need find no instance of actual judicial bias"]; Nightlife Partners Ltd. v. City of Beverly Hills (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 81, 90 ("Nightlife Partners") ["Just as in a judicial proceeding, due process in an administrative hearing also demands an appearance of fairness and the absence of even a probability

¹ The State Water Board has the duty to demonstrate compliance with due process. (Howitt v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1575, 1587.) Further, it would be a significant burden for CAW to serve discovery requests and depose every staff member on the hearing team, the prosecutorial team, and all other potential participating staff. (Ibid. ["As a practical matter, were the burden allocated otherwise, it would seldom if ever be possible" to prove due process was violated.].) Also, if CAW were to conduct discovery, it would run the risk of a greater level of enforcement. In its prehearing brief, the prosecutorial team cautioned against delay; indicating that, if there were a delay in this proceeding, the prosecutorial team may seek a greater level or alternative enforcement against CAW. Undoubtedly, the type of discovery required to determine the role(s) of State Water Board staff would delay this proceeding.

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of outside influence on the adjudication."] (emphasis in original); Yaqub v. Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 474, 486 ["The question is not whether the judge is actually biased, but whether a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to act without integrity, impartiality and competency."].) At a minimum, the appearance of bias occurs when "advocacy and decision-making roles are combined." (Howitt v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal. App. 4th 1575, 1585 ("Howitt").) The prohibition on combining roles, or "dual representation," precludes a single person from serving advisory and prosecutorial functions, particularly if the person holds those dual roles during the same time frame, even if the matters are unrelated. (Morongo, p. 5 ["The fact that she wore a prosecutorial hat in one proceeding and an advisory hat in another in the same time frame is sufficient" to establish a due process violation.]; Quintero v. City of Santa Ana (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 810, 817 ("Quintero") [in its evaluation of the prosecutorial appearance of Halford, who had previously advised the Board on a number of occasions, the court stated: "Here, there is no evidence that Halford acted as both the Board's legal advisor and in a prosecutorial function in this case. However, Halford's other interactions with the Board give the appearance of bias and unfairness and suggest the probability of his influence on the Board."]; Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 1, 5 ("Quintanar") ["One fairness principle directs that in adjudicative matters, one adversary should not be permitted to bend the ear of the ultimate decision maker or the decision maker's advisers in private. Another directs that the functions of prosecution and adjudication be kept separate, carried out by distinct individuals."].)

In addition to the appearance of bias, due process prohibits ex parte communications on substantive issues between those who are prosecuting a claim and the decision-making body or its advisors. (Govt. Code, 11430.10; *Quintanar*, p. 10 ["An agency prosecutor cannot secretly communicate with the agency decision maker or the decision maker's advisor about the substance of the case prior to issuance of a final decision."].) The purpose of restricting ex parte communication is, in part, to allow administrative agencies to maintain internal adjudicative proceedings, while ensuring the non-agency party receives a neutral and fair determination. (*Quintanar*, p. 10 ["Procedural fairness does not mandate the dissolution of unitary agencies, but it

does require some internal separation between advocates and decision makers to preserve neutrality."]; English v. City of Long Beach (1950) 35 Cal.2d 155, 158-159 ["[T]he right of a 2 hearing before an administrative tribunal would be meaningless if the tribunal were permitted to base its determination upon information received without the knowledge of the parties."].) Unitary administrative agencies must implement procedures to guarantee the prosecutorial and decision making parties are sufficiently "screened" from each other. (Howitt, p. 1587 ["Performance of both roles by the same [agency] is appropriate only if there are assurances that the advisor for the decision maker is screened from any inappropriate contact with the advocate."].) The party relying on the method of separation has the burden of proving the advocate and decision makers are sufficiently screened. (Ibid. ["The burden of providing such assurances must rest with the [agency] performing the dual roles . . . "].) If properly implemented, internal screening procedures should be evident. (Ibid. ["If the advisor has been screened, it should be relatively easy for [agency] counsel to explain the screening procedures in effect."].)

B. Documents Prepared By The State Water Board Staff Raise Due Process Concerns For CAW

CAW is concerned that the structure of this proceeding violates due process because of an appearance of bias.² CAW is also concerned that, because there is ambiguity as to the roles of certain State Water Board staff, the prohibition on ex parte communications may not ensure CAW receives a fair hearing.

On or about March 5, 2008, the State Water Board officially noticed this proceeding. (CAW-0010 (Office Notice of Hearing).) In the notice, the State Water Board identified the staff who were assigned to prosecute and the staff that would assist the Hearing Officers in deciding the case. (Id., p. 1.) However, prior to and since its receipt of the notice, CAW received at least two

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² In its notice for this proceeding, the State Water Board makes clear that its rules against ex parte communications apply to the prosecutorial team. (Exhibit CAW-0010, p. 3.) CAW recognizes that the prohibition against ex parte communication helps provide due process protections. However, that prohibition, alone, does not ensure all due process requirements are satisfied. Notwithstanding any ex parte rules, due process prohibits bias or the appearance of bias. (See Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2006) 40 Cal. App. 4th 1, 5 ["One fairness principle directs that in adjudicative matters, one adversary should not be permitted to bend the ear of the ultimate decision maker or the decision maker's advisers in private. Another directs that the functions of prosecution and adjudication be kept separate, carried out be distinct individuals."].)

documents prepared by the State Water Board staff that raise due process concerns.

On January 15, 2008, Mr. Kassel notified CAW that he would pursue a cease and desist order against CAW. (CAW-007 (Letter from James Kassel).) When Mr. Kassel sent that letter, he provided copies to Mr. Thomas Howard, Chief Deputy Director of the State Water Board, Ms. Victoria A. Whitney, Deputy Director for Water Rights, and Mr. Andy Sawyer, Assistant Chief Counsel. (Id., p. 2.)

On April 3, 2008, Charles Lindsay, Chief Hearings Unit for the State Water Board, Division of Water Rights, sent an email regarding the status of a non-party entity in this proceeding. (Exhibit CAW-0020 (Charles Lindsay e-mail).) Mr. Lindsey addressed this correspondence to the parties, the non-party entities, and members of the hearing team. However, he also provided copies of the correspondence to Ms. Whitney, Mr. Sawyer, and Mr. Les Grober, Supervisor for the Hearing & Special Project Section of the State Water Board. (Ibid.) None of those staff members were assigned to either the prosecutorial or hearing teams. (See Exhibit CAW-0010 (Official Notice of Hearing), p. 3). Although this type of communication usually signals interest or involvement in a matter, it is unclear what, if any, role these parties play in this proceeding. At a minimum, the communications from Mr. Kassel and Mr. Lindsay give rise to an appearance of bias.

The inclusion of Mr. Howard, Ms. Whitney, Mr. Sawyer, and Mr. Grober in communications related to this proceeding suggests there could be an unlawful mixing of advocacy and decision-making roles. Mr. Howard, Ms. Whitney, Mr. Sawyer, and Mr. Grober serve the State Water Board in various capacities. An appearance of bias will arise if any one of them concurrently serves as a prosecutor and an advisor, even if proceedings are unrelated. The appearance of bias may also exist if any one of the afore-mentioned staff historically held one role and in this proceeding holds the other. The lack of disclosure regarding interested, but unassigned staff members does not allow CAW to determine if an appearance of bias is avoided. To the contrary, the communications received by CAW suggest otherwise.

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Furthermore, if Mr. Howard, Ms. Whitney, Mr. Sawyer, or Mr. Grober is involved in this proceeding, it is not possible for CAW to ensure how its due process rights are protected through ex parte communication rules. These State Water Board staff members were not designated in the March 5, 2008 notice for this proceeding. As a result, the rules prohibiting against ex parte communications do not explicitly apply to them. CAW believes Mr. Howard, Ms. Whitney, Mr. Sawyer, or Mr. Grober each supervises State Water Board staff, including members of the prosecutorial team and hearing team for this proceeding. If that belief is true, the circumstance gives rise to serious due process concerns. The State Water Board has the burden of proving the advocate and decision makers are sufficiently screened. At this time, it has not done that. Internal screening procedures are not evident. As a result, the State Water Board must demonstrate to CAW that the decision-makers have been and will continue to be screened from any inappropriate contact.

C. Composition Of Prosecutorial Team May Violate Due Process

Notwithstanding the arguments above, Mr. Kassel's membership on the prosecutorial team may give rise to due process violations. For an extended period of time, Mr. Kassel appeared to have a principle role in determining whether CAW was in compliance with Order 95-10. As an example, on June 7, 2006, Mr. Kassel signed a letter written by Ms. Whitney and sent on behalf of the State Water Board. The letter discussed CAW's compliance with Order 95-10. (Exhibit CAW-021 (James Kassel Compliance Letter).) The letter expressed concern with the level of progress by CAW and the Monterey Peninsula Water Management District in complying with Order 95-10. (Exhibit CAW-021, p. 1 (James Kassel Compliance Letter).) The fact that Ms. Whitney and Mr. Kassel apparently acted on behalf of the State Water Board not only suggests Mr. Kassel advised the State Water Board, but the authority delegated to Mr. Kassel likely placed him directly in the seat of the decision-maker (he expressed concern with CAW compliance efforts).³

At some time after signing the June 7, 2006 letter but before January 15, 2008, Mr. Kassel (and possibly Ms. Whitney and other staff members) apparently switched roles, taking on a

³ Other State Water Board staff may have a similar conflict as Mr. Kassel. The State Water Board must explain the roles of all State Water Board staff who were identified as part of the prosecutorial team, part of the hearing team, or identified in correspondence served in this proceeding.

prosecutorial function. He and other unknown staff of the State Water Board prepared and issued a 1 notice informing CAW that Mr. Kassel and other State Water Board staff would prosecute a cease 2 and desist order against CAW. (Exhibit CAW-007 (Letter from James Kassel), p. 1.)4 The State 3 Water Board recognized Mr. Kassel's new role as prosecutor in its March 5, 2008 official notice for 4 this proceeding. (Exhibit CAW-0010 (Office Notice of Hearing), p. 3.) There, the State Water 5 Board designated Mr. Kassel as a member of the prosecutorial team. (Exhibit CAW-0010 (Office 6 Notice of Hearing), p. 3.) 7 If the appearances above prove true, Mr. Kassel (and possibly other State Water Board staff) 8 as advisors to the decision-maker or directly as the decision-makers are precluded from acting and 9 subsequently from appearing before the State Water Board in a prosecutorial role. (Ouintero, p. 816 10 ["An ongoing relationship with the Board is enough to show the probability of actual bias. It would 11 only be natural for the Board members who have looked to [Mr. Kassel] for advice and guidance, to 12 give more credence to his arguments."]; Nightlife Partners, p. 94 [determined an individual who 13 served as an advisor was prohibited from appearing before the Board in a prosecutorial role!) To 14 allow him or any other State Water Board staff member such dual representation in the same matter, 15 16 or on a matter involving substantially similar issues, would clearly violate CAW's due process. (Morongo, p.5; Quintero, p. 817; Quintanar, p. 5.) 17 /// 18 /// 19 1// 20 III21 22 /// 111 23 111 /// 25 26

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in this proceeding.

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⁴ The fact that CAW is not aware of the staff members with whom Mr. Kassel work when preparing the notice and draft

cease and desist order provides an additional reason CAW is concerned that its due process rights have not be protected

Ш. Conclusion

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The State Water Board is required to conduct this proceeding in a manner that affords CAW due process. Documents from the State Water Board and its staff raise serious concerns with the ability of the State Water Board to meet that obligation. Therefore, CAW respectfully requests the State Water Board demonstrate that CAW will be afforded due process. CAW recognizes to do that, it may be necessary for the State Water Board to disqualify members of its staff from further participation in this proceeding.

Dated: April 23, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

JON D. RUBIN

DIEPENBROCK HARRISON A Professional Corporation

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Attorneys for California American Water Company

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DIEPENBROCK HARRISON ATTORNEYS AT LAW

PROOF OF SERVICE

I declare as follows: 1 I am over 18 years of age and not a party to the within action; my business address is 400 2 Capitol Mall, Suite 1800, Sacramento, California, I am employed in Sacramento County, California. 3 On April 23, 2008, I served a copy of the foregoing document following document entitled MOTION BY CALIFORNIA AMERICAN WATER COMPANY TO ENSURE DUE 5 PROCESS on the following interested parties in the above-referenced case number to the 6 following: 8 See Attached Service List of Participants X 9 By following ordinary business practice, placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, for collection and mailing with the United States Postal Service where it would be deposited for first class delivery, postage fully prepaid, in the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business as indicated in the attached Service List of Participants and noted as "Service by Mail." 10 11 [X]ELECTRONIC MAIL 12 I caused a true and correct scanned image (.PDF file) copy to be transmitted via the electronic mail transfer system in place at Diepenbrock Harrison, originating from the undersigned at 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1800, Sacramento, California, to the e-mail address(es) indicated in the attached Service List of Participants and noted by "Service by Electronic Mail." 13 14 BY FACSIMILE at a.m./p.m. to the fax number(s) listed above. The facsimile machine I used complied with California Rules of Court, rule 2003 and no error was reported by the machine. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 2006(d), I caused the machine to print a transmission record of the transmission, a copy of which is 15 16 attached to this declaration. A true and correct copy was also forwarded by regular U.S. Mail by following ordinary business practice, placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, for collection and mailing with the United States Postal Service where it would be deposited for first-class delivery, postage fully prepaid, in the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business. 17 18 19 BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
[] Federal Express [] Golden State Overnight [] 20 Depositing copies of the above documents in a box or other facility regularly maintained by Federal Express, or Golden State Overnight, in an envelope or package designated by Federal Express or Golden State Overnight with delivery fees paid or provided for. 21 [] PERSONAL SERVICE 22 via process server via hand by 23 I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing 24 is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on April 23, 2008, at Sacramento, 25 California. Dearth V. Cuchi 26 olanthe V. Onishi 27 28

DIEPENBROCK
HARRISON
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

CALIFORNIA AMERICAN WATER CEASE AND DESIST ORDER JUNE 19, 2008 HEARING SERVICE LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

1 2 3 Service by Electronic Mail: 4 State Water Resources Control Board Division of Ratepayer Advocates 5 Andrew Ulmer Reed Sato Division of Ratepayer Advocates Water Rights Prosecution Team California Public Utilities Commission 1001 I Street 6 Sacramento, CA 95814 505 Van Ness Avenue San Francisco, CA 94102 (916) 341-5889 7 (415) 703-2056 rsato@waterboards.ca.gov eau@cpuc.ca.gov 8 Sierra Club - Ventana Chapter **Public Trust Alliance** 9 Laurens Silver Michael Warburton California Environmental Law Project Resource Renewal Institute 10 Room 290, Building D P.O. Box 667 Fort Mason Center. Mill Valley, CA 94942 11 San Francisco, CA 94123 (415) 383-7734 Michael@rri.org larrysilver@earthlink.net 12 igwill@dcn.davis.ca.us 13 **Carmel River Steelhead Association** California Sportfishing Protection Michael B. Jackson Alliance 14 Michael B. Jackson P.O. Box 207 **Quincy, CA 95971** P. O. Box 207 15 (530) 283-1007 Quincy, CA 95971 mjatty@sbcglobal.net (530) 283-1007 16 miatty@sbcglobal.net 17 City of Seaside The Seaside Basin Watermaster Russell M. McGlothlin Russell M. McGlothlin 18 Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber, Schreck Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber, Schreck 21 East Carrillo Street 21 East Carrillo Street 19 Santa Barbara, CA 93101 Santa Barbara, CA 93101 (805) 963-7000 (805) 963-7000 20 RMcGlothlin@BHFS.com RMcGlothlin@BHFS.com 21 Pebble Beach Company **National Marine Fisheries Service** 22 Thomas H. Jamison Christopher Keifer 501 W. Ocean Blvd., Suite 4470 Fenton & Keller Long Beach, CA 90802 23 P.O. Box 791 Monterey, CA 93942-0791 (831) 373-1241 (562) 950-4076 24 christopher.keifer@noaa.gov TJamison@FentonKeller.com 25 ²⁶

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
Service by Electronic-Mail (Cont.'): 1 2 Monterey County Hospitality Association California Salmon and Steelhead Bob McKenzie Association 3 P.O. Box 223542 Bob Baiocchi Carmel, CA 93922 P.O. Box 1790 4 (831) 626-8636 Graeagle, CA 96103 info@mcha.net (530) 836-1115 5 bobmck@mbay.net rbaiocchi@gotsky.com 6 Planning and Conservation League 7 Jonas Minton 1107 9th Street, Suite 360 8 Sacramento, CA 95814 (916) 719-4049 9 iminton@pcl.org 10 11 Service By Mail: 12 Monterey Peninsula Water Management City of Sand City District James G. Reisinger, Jr. 13 David C. Laredo Heisinger, Buck & Morris De Lay & Laredo P.O. Box 5427 14 606 Forest Avenue Carmel, CA 93921 Pacific Grove, CA 93950 (831) 624-3891 15 (831) 646-1502 16 City of Carmel-by-the-Sea Donald G. Freeman 17 P.O. Box CC Carmel-by-the-Sea, CA 93921 18 (831) 624-5339 ext. 11 19 20 21 22 23 24

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A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

JOHN V. "JACK" DIEPEHBROCK KAREN L. DIEPENBROCK KEITH W. McBRIDE BRADLEY I. ELKIN FILEEN H. DIEPENBROCK MARK D. HARRISON GENE K CHEEVER LAWRENCE R. GARCIA SIESAN E. KIRKGRARD ANDREA A. MATARAZZO JOEL PATRICK ERB JON D. RUBIN JENNIFER L. DAUER JEFFREY K. DORSO

R. JAMES DIEPENBROCK (1929 - 2002)

SEAN K. HUNGERFORD LEGNOR Y DICOLCAN TULIE V. REISER CHRIS A. McCAHDLESS DAN M. SILVERBOARD ANDREW P. TATIRIAINEN I AMONT T. KING, IR. DANIEL J. WHITNEY DAVID A. DIEPENBROCK JONATHAN R. MARZ VALERIE C. KINCAID KRISTA I. DUNZWEILER SARSH R HARTMANN MARK E. PETERSON JASON S. RÖSENBERG

REFEREY L. ANDERSON

June 9, 2008

Via e-mail: wrhearing@waterboards.gov And U.S. Mail

Mr. Arthur G. Baggett, Jr., Esq. (via e:mail: abaggett@waterboards.ca.gov) Gary Wolff, P.E., Ph.D. (via e-mail: gwolff@waterboards.ca.gov) Board Members and Hearing Officers State Water Resources Control Board 1010 | Street Sacramento, CA 95814

Proposed Draft Cease and Desist Order No. 2008-XXXX-XXX. California American Water

Dear Hearing Officers Baggett and Wolff:

I write on behalf of California American Water Company ("CAW") and to you in your capacity as the hearing officers in the proceeding to consider the above-referenced proposed order. CAW maintains significant concerns with the manner in which this proceeding is being conducted. Specifically, CAW does not believe it will be afforded due process if the proceeding continues as it is currently structured.¹

Less than two months ago, CAW filed a motion explaining that, because of the structure of the proceeding, CAW's due process might be jeopardized. CAW requested, in part, the State Water Resources Control Board ("State Water Board") take the necessary steps to ensure CAW would receive a fair hearing; one without the appearance of bias. One of the concerns expressed by CAW was the circumstance whereby State Water Board staff who previously assisted the State Water Board with

400 CAPITOL MALL .SUITE 1800 SACRAMENTO, CA 95814

Given the significance of its concern, CAW wanted to quickly raise this issue to you. If the hearing officers desire legal briefing on this issue, CAW will prepare and file such a pleading.

DIEPENBROCK HARRISON

Mr. Arthur G. Baggett, Jr., Esq. Gary Wolff, P.E., Ph.D. June 9, 2008
Page 2

adjudicatory functions related to Order 95-10 now appeared to serve to prosecute CAW for alleged violations of that same order. No change to this proceeding was made as a result of CAW's motion.

An adjudicatory proceeding violates due process rights and challenges the foundation of a fair proceeding if the proceeding is conducted with an undue risk of bias. This past Friday, the State Water Board prosecutorial team filed written testimony for this proceeding, including testimony for Ms. Mrowka. Ms. Mrowka's testimony makes clear that, if this proceeding continues as it is currently structured, CAW will not be afforded due process. The structure of this proceeding creates an unacceptable risk of bias.

Ms. Mrowka explains that she has historically assisted the State Water Board with adjudicatory functions related to Order 95-10. Ms. Mrowka is prepared to testify under oath that she was "responsible for assisting the State Water Board during the [Order 95-10] proceeding and was also responsible for assisting with the preparation of Order WR 95-10 and Decision 1632 as a result of the hearing." (Exhibit PT 2, p. 2.) She also concedes she "routinely write [sic] Cal Am regarding its compliance." (Exhibit PT 2, p. 3.) She explains: "the letters generally state whether Cal Am has complied with Order WR 95-10." (Exhibit PT 2, p. 6.)

The written testimony that she prepared in support of the prosecutorial team reflects her current assignment, assisting in the prosecution of an alleged violation of the same order she apparently helped prepare and for which she determined whether CAW was in compliance. Ms. Mrowka clearly worked with the prosecutorial team to prepare and submit testimony for this hearing. Her current role can only be interpreted to reflect Ms. Mrowka's position on the prosecutorial team.² To state or find otherwise presumably would be a concession that the prosecutorial team violated ex parte rules.

Like the argument made by CAW in its prior motion, due process protections are compromised when one like Ms. Mrowka, who historically acted as an adjudicator or member of a team performing an adjudicatory function on an issue, now supports the

² Ms. Mrowka, as well as other State Water Board staff members, have been designated part of the prosecutorial team in another pending proceeding. (See Notice of Public Hearing and Pre-Hearing Conference In Re: Proposed Revocation of Permits 16209, 16210, 16211 and 16212 (Applications 18721, 18723, 21636 and 21637), a copy of which is enclosed hereto.) The participation by Ms. Mrowka and possible others in that separate yet concurrent proceeding raise due process issues and concerns, as well.

DIEPENBROCK HARRISON

Mr. Arthur G. Baggett, Jr., Esq. Gary Wolff, P.E., Ph.D. June 9, 2008 Page 3

prosecution effort related to that same issue. Thus, for the above-stated reasons, CAW renews its prior objection on due process grounds. Thank you in advance for your prompt consideration of this objection. Given the existing schedule, CAW respectfully requests a timely response to this letter.

Very truly yours,

DIEPENBROCK HARRISON A Professional Corporation

By: Jon D. Rubin

Attorneys for California American Water Company

Enclosure

cc: Service List [copy attached] (Via e-mail and U.S. Mail)

Paul Murphey (via e-mail: PMurphey@waterboards.ca.gov)

Ernest Mona (via e-mail: EMona@waterboards.ca.gov)

Carrie Gleeson, Esq. Tim Miller, Esq.

CALIFORNIA AMERICAN WATER CEASE AND DESIST ORDER

JUNE 19, 2008 HEARING

SERVICE LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Division of Ratepayer Advocates

Andrew Ulmer
Division of Ratepayer Advocates
California Public Utilities Commission
505 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 703-2056
eau@cpuc.ca.gov

Public Trust Alliance

Michael Warburton Resource Renewal Institute Room 290, Building D Fort Mason Center . San Francisco, CA 94123 Michael@rri.org

Carmel River Steelhead Association

Michael B. Jackson P.O. Box 207 Quincy, CA 95971 (530) 283-1007 miatty@sbcglobal.net

City of Seaside

Russell M. McGlothlin Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber, Schreck 21 East Carrillo Street Santa Barbara, CA 93101 (805) 963-7000 RMcGlothlin@BHFS.com

State Water Resources Control Board

Reed Sato Water Rights Prosecution Team 1001 I Street Sacramento, CA 95814 (916) 341-5889 rsato@waterboards.ca.gov

Sierra Club - Ventana Chapter

Laurens Silver
California Environmental Law Project
P.O. Box 667
Mill Valley, CA 94942
(415) 383-7734
larrysilver@earthlink.net
jgwill@dcn.davis.ca.us

California Sportfishing Protection Alliance

Michael B. Jackson P. O. Box 207 Quincy, CA 95971 (530) 283-1007 mjatty@sbcglobal.net

The Seaside Basin Watermaster

Russell M. McGlothlin Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber, Schreck 21 East Carrillo Street Santa Barbara, CA 93101 (805) 963-7000 RMcGlothlin@BHFS.com

Pebble Beach Company

Thomas H. Jamison
Fenton & Keller
P.O. Box 791
Monterey, CA 93942-0791
(831) 373-1241
TJamison@FentonKeller.com

National Marine Fisheries Service

Christopher Keifer
501 W. Ocean Blvd., Suite 4470
Long Beach, CA 90802
(562) 950-4076
christopher.keifer@noaa.gov

Monterey County Hospitality Association

Bob McKenzie P.O. Box 223542 Carmel, CA 93922 (831) 626-8636 info@mcha.net bobmck@mbay.net

California Salmon and Steelhead Association

Bob Baiocchi P.O. Box 1790 Graeagle, CA 96103 (530) 836-1115 rbaiocchi@gotsky.com

Planning and Conservation League

Jonas Minton 1107 9th Street, Suite 360 Sacramento, CA 95814 (916) 719-4049 iminton@pcl.org

City of Sand City

James G. Heisinger, Jr. Heisinger, Buck & Morris P.O. Box 5427 Carmel, CA 93921 (831) 624-3891 hbm@carmellaw.com

Monterey Peninsula Water Management District

David C. Laredo
De Lay & Laredo
606 Forest Avenue
Pacific Grove, CA 93950
(831) 646-1502
dave@laredolaw.net

Via U.S. Mail only:

City of Carmel-by-the-Sea Donald G. Freeman P.O. Box CC Carmel-by-the-Sea, CA 93921 (831) 624-5339 ext. 11